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Dari/Pashto Terms
arbab  village or community leader
chak bashi community-level water bailiff on tertiary canals (northern Afghanistan)
hasher community maintenance contribution on canals, imposed on irrigators as part of their social 
obligations
jerib  a jerib is one-fifth of a hectare or 2,000 square metres
juftgaw  unit of irrigated land: flow/volume to area ratio under which water rights or turns are 
allocated on main canals; derives from a yoke of paired, ploughing oxen and reflects area 
ploughed by two oxen for different soil types and land slopes; directly proportional to 
irrigated area and often approximated by jerib; the entitlement of any particular community 
is the sum of all individual juftgaw of that community
karez  underground canal system that taps aquifers by gravity through a series of underground 
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kok bashi  tertiary, or community-level, water master
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Executive Summary
This report has three objectives:
To synthesise and analyse the current water 1. 
resources management policy environment as 
it pertains to engaging community structures 
in development planning
To describe and comparatively analyse 2. 
the social, structural and operational 
characteristics of traditional water 
management institutions around the country
Drawing upon these findings, to analyse the 3. 
principal opportunities and challenges of 
using community institutions within formal 
water rights management structures 
Recent drafts of the Water Sector Strategy (WSS) and 
the Water Law provide the main policy environment 
for water management. The drafts of the WSS pay 
tribute to integrated water resources management 
(IWRM) by incorporating stakeholder participation 
at the local level (with a focus on water user 
associations or WUAs) and at the basin level (with a 
focus on river basin councils). This is also emphasised 
in the Draft Water Law, with its section on river 
basin councils and sub-basin councils. The law on 
WUAs, however, is less explicit. While the July 2007 
Draft WSS focused on water pricing, the February 
2008 draft focused on poverty alleviation and did 
not discuss water pricing (although cost recovery 
for construction and services is still anticipated). 
The June 2008 Draft Water Law continues to focus 
on establishing a modern permit system, with 
the exception of right-of-way areas (areas that 
are protected and free from interventions). All 
versions of the Draft WSS have a strong focus on 
infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion. The 
drafts highlight the role of NGOs and donors in 
achieving this, but not all of them deal with the 
negative consequences that these efforts might 
have for downstream riparian states. 
The WSS drafts portray the existing mirab water 
system as dysfunctional and promote the WUA 
system to take its place, but they also admit that the 
mirab system has not been researched. Although the 
WSS drafts emphasise the necessity for river basin 
organisations, such as river basin councils (RBCs) 
and river basin agencies (RBAs), the July 2007 draft 
questions their feasibility. The February 2008 draft 
highlights the constraints of the water sector, thus 
also implicitly raising concerns about whether or 
not RBAs and RBCs are feasible. The July 2007 draft 
identifies river basins and sub-basins with maps, 
however, and even presents an organisational 
chart for how basin organisations should be set 
up. The latest draft of the WSS (February 2008) 
includes neither maps nor organisational charts and 
therefore reveals fewer details. The opportunities 
the basin approach provides for the end-user are 
frequently stated, and the organisational chart 
demonstrates the bottom-up nature of the basin 
councils. However, the main outline in the June 2008 
Draft Water Law shows that the Ministry for Energy 
and Water is responsible for establishing the basin 
and sub-basin councils as well as basin agencies, 
which are supposed to facilitate and implement 
the decisions of the basin councils. Although the 
basic framework for basin organisation is defined 
and roles are allocated, important questions 
about decision-making in the basin councils are 
“Even though you may be the son of the mirab, it’s better to be one intake higher 
up [the canal].” 
“Better to be a servant in the upstream area than a king in the downstream area.”
— Afghan proverbs
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not specifically articulated. It is not evident, 
therefore, who will be represented in the councils 
and how votes in the councils will be shared among 
different stakeholders. The June 2008 Draft Water 
Law contains references to right-of-way areas and 
suggests that these areas will not be included in the 
basin approach or represented in the councils. The 
implication is that there is no basin approach and 
no integrated water management with stakeholder 
participation. The right-of-way reference does 
reflect the reality on the ground. Nevertheless, 
why have a law on basin management if substantial 
parts of the basin are excluded? 
While a previous draft of the Water Law made 
reference to the “praiseworthy customs and 
traditions of the Afghan people,” the June 2008 
draft uses weaker terminology, “considering the 
appropriate/suitable water use traditions and 
customs,” which boils down to having a mirab 
(water master’s assistant) or mirab bashi (water 
master) in a WUA. While previous drafts focused 
on “fair, effective and economical allocation of 
available water resources,” the current draft only 
makes statements on cost recovery, but it has also 
a focus on irrigation norms and the establishment 
of a permit and license system. Currently, three 
terms are used within the law: permit (water use), 
license (for infrastructure) and water right. 
The term water right is not defined and is used in 
the law to refer to individual as well as collective 
(canal-level) rights. It is foreseen in the Draft Water 
Law that currently existing water rights will be 
transformed into permits and that to be established 
WUAs will obtain permits only. No reference is made 
to licenses for traditional intakes. Since current 
water rights are not measured and depend on water 
availability in the river as well as on the construction 
of the intake, it is not evident what permits should 
entail. In any case, basin councils will be able to 
change or even cancel permits. Water rights can be 
cancelled if users do not pay. Permits are required 
both for water extraction and for drainage flows. 
This implies that WUAs have to have at least two 
permits (assuming one intake and drain only). The 
issuing of permits depends on gauging, not only 
for extraction but also for drainage. Currently 
there is little if any gauging capacity; hence, it is 
questionable whether meaningful permits can be 
issued. In addition to the problem of gauging, there 
is the problem of law enforcement, and this may 
explain the emphasis on right-of-way in the law. 
The February 2008 Draft WSS therefore makes a 
distinction between urban and rural water supplies. 
The focus in urban areas is on rule enforcement, 
including building the capacity of the Ministry of 
the Interior, but in rural areas the focus is only on 
governance. 
There are also inconsistencies of terminology 
regarding associations of water users, which are 
supposed to be set up by the Ministry of Energy 
and Water. The term “association of water users” 
is defined, but the terms “irrigation associations” 
(which are set up by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Livestock) and “associations of 
users” are also mentioned in the law. This is 
despite the fact that “association of water users” 
implies a variety of stakeholder groups that might 
use a water source for variety of purposes, such as 
irrigation, livestock, drinking water, sanitation and 
even electricity production. The definition given 
in the Draft Water Law focuses on the common 
objective of the water users in the association, 
however, suggesting that the focus will only be on 
one particular use—irrigation—and the approach 
will not be an integrated one. Articles in the Draft 
Water Law that refer to associations of water users 
or that specify the responsibilities of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock and the Ministry 
of Energy and Water use differing terminology, 
which creates both overlaps of responsibility 
and ambiguity regarding which ministry will be 
responsible for addressing which areas. 
The second objective of this study was to describe 
and comparatively analyse the social, structural 
and operational characteristics of traditional water 
management institutions in Afghanistan. To achieve 
this, fieldwork and a review of studies on social 
water management were conducted in Afghanistan 
in September and October 2007. The literature 
review included an earlier study1 that was highly 
1 J.L. Lee, “Water Resource Management on the Balkh Ab River 
and Hazhda Nahr Canal Network: From Crisis to Collapse” (report 
commissioned by United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
[UNAMA], Northern Region, implementing agency: Central Asian Free 
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negative regarding the functionality of the mirab 
system and made assumptions on the structure 
of this system for the whole of Afghanistan. Later 
studies2 revealed that the mirab system is still 
functioning and that its structure is highly varied. 
The reviewed studies show that, at the community 
level, the mirab system appears to be equitable 
in terms of water distribution and maintenance 
work. These studies also show, however, that water 
allocation among communities along main canals 
is inequitable. The review illustrates that the 
mirab system is not isolated; instead, it is linked to 
administrative units at the district or province levels. 
In the past, the government used taxes to partially 
decrease inequities in water distribution. Linkages 
between the mirab system and administrative units 
have also been used to resolve conflicts at the canal 
level and between canals. 
The fieldwork conducted for this study confirmed 
that the system has high levels of inequity in 
terms of water allocation and maintenance work 
along the main canal. Head-enders receive more 
water than mid- and tail-enders but are required 
to contribute less maintenance work (primarily 
at the canal intake). Tail-enders often end up 
cleaning the whole canal but receiving the least 
water. Consequently, the mirab often comes from 
the tail-end, because head-enders do not need him 
and in some cases even refuse to contribute to his 
wages. The built-in inequity is highlighted in the 
Afghan proverb introduced at the beginning of this 
report, “Even though you may be the son of the 
mirab, it’s better to be one intake higher up [the 
canal].” The proverb highlights inequity between 
canals as well as within them, suggesting that the 
further upstream, the better the water supply. This 
was also partly confirmed during the fieldwork. 
The fieldwork showed that measuring water only at 
the intake is not sufficient for understanding how 
much water is used for irrigation, and that water 
measuring at the off-take level would be difficult, 
Exchange, 2003).
2 J.L. Lee, “Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: 
Social Water Management” (Kabul : Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 
Unit, 2006); J.L. Lee, “Water Management, Livestock and the Opium 
Economy: The Performance of Community Water Management Systems” 
(Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007);
since different technologies are in use and water 
from one off-take might supply more than one 
farmer. The fieldwork also brought to light a new 
threat to the traditional mirab system from wheat 
and rice mills and micro-hydropower plants. Even 
though their use is nonconsumptive, their location 
at head-end or mid-end secondary canals causes 
substantial amounts of water to be diverted from 
the main canal into secondary canals and from there 
back to the river or to other canals. Hence, they 
are mainly a threat to tail-enders. The June 2008 
Draft Water Law has one article dealing with this 
issue (though it only mentions micro-hydropower 
plants, not mills), but the main shortcoming is 
that micro-hydropower plants and mills, unlike 
other infrastructure, do not need a license for 
construction or a permit for operation. The general 
problem of enforceability in the rural areas makes 
it unlikely that the threat to tail-enders can be 
sufficiently dealt with. In addition, the most 
recent Draft WSS (February 2008), unlike the July 
2007 draft, encourages the construction of micro-
hydropower plants with the reasoning that they 
“will contribute to the counter-narcotics efforts 
through strengthening the options for alternative 
livelihoods.” 
Five major conclusions can be drawn: 
Although the Draft Water Sector Strategy and 1. 
the Draft Water Law have a modern outlook, it 
appears that the local system is still functioning 
in a traditional way, but without the support 
it used to get from government agencies. This 
implies that the transaction costs will be very 
high if a completely new system of “modern” 
WUAs is established based on self-governance 
and equity between members. It might be 
more effective to focus on the special needs 
of individual canal communities and to work 
with the communities on rules that are locally 
needed and locally agreeable. However, rule 
enforcement has to be facilitated by the 
government, which is currently a demand of 
the canal communities.
The focus on permits does not reflect the 2. 
local reality and the technology in use. 
At the present, it would be impossible to 
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voting power within the councils still has to 
be addressed. One danger might be that the 
councils do not reflect current water allocation 
and therefore the local canal communities will 
not support their decisions. Since this is in any 
case an unlikely event, one has to question the 
purpose of the section of the law that focuses 
on basin management. Hence, it appears 
questionable whether the basin organisations 
(agencies and councils) will have the power to 
enforce decisions, already the governmental 
departments on the provincial or district level 
struggle with enforcement of decisions and 
rules. Therefore, one might raise the question 
as to whether priority should be given first 
to re-establishing the linkages between 
canal-level and government administrations, 
especially since the canal communities want 
support from the government.
Last but not least, the mirab system is very 5. 
complex and diverse and remains under-
researched. More fundamental and long-term 
research is necessary to facilitate appropriate 
water sector strategies and current NGO 
involvement at the canal level. Even though 
the drafts of the WSS admit that research 
has not been conducted, they do not call for 
future research.
measure how much water is consumed within 
one canal. Furthermore, the inequity within 
the current system would imply that, if the 
amount of water allowable under a water 
permit was reduced, the reduction would 
not be equitably distributed within the canal 
system, and tail-enders would suffer the 
most. Given the absence of gauging stations, 
one has to question the purpose of the law’s 
focus on permits. Permits should only be seen 
as a long-term strategy, only implementable 
when the technology is in place, local 
management systems have been strengthened 
and the government is able to control water 
use and, if needed, enforce the limits stated 
in the permits. As a long-term strategy, it is 
questionable whether it merits a section in 
the current law. Pessimism about a permit 
system, licenses for new infrastructure 
(including micro-hydropower plants and 
mills) and restrictions on operation appears 
appropriate.
There is a danger that externally funded 3. 
projects, involving either construction 
of intakes or maintenance work, might 
weaken collective action within the canal 
communities or increase already existing 
inequity in maintenance work requirements. 
Building permanent intake structures further 
reduces the labour contribution of the 
head-enders and therefore reduces their 
need to participate in collective action or 
to acknowledge the position of the mirab. 
Therefore, it is recommended that prior to 
rehabilitation of intakes the communities 
agree on the future sharing of water and of 
maintenance tasks. These agreements should 
be presented to the irrigation departments, 
which then would have the responsibility 
to enforce them. Again, this would require 
support from government agencies. 
The implication of the right-of-way clause 4. 
in the June 2008 Draft Water Law is that 
there will not be a basin approach or IWRM. 
Hypothetically speaking, even in the very 
unlikely event that a basin has no right-of-
way area, the question of representation and 
1Water Strategy Meets Local Reality
Introduction1. 
Afghanistan, like other Central Asian countries and 
many other countries of the global South, is adopting 
internationally recommended water management 
policies. Since the 1990s, the concept of integrated 
water resources management (IWRM) has been 
promoted for the river basin level. Consequently, 
water management systems reflecting natural 
boundaries instead of administrative boundaries 
are promoted. In addition, since the financial 
crises experienced in the Countries of the South 
from the 1980s onwards, these countries have been 
advised to establish standardised models of water 
user associations (WUAs) at the local level to take 
over the operation and maintenance of irrigation 
systems. 
Different Afghan drafts of the Water Sector 
Strategy (WSS)1 and the Water Law2  reflect these 
international recommendations to different degrees. 
The research undertaken for the present report 
had the purpose of critically analysing these drafts 
and comparing them with local water management 
practices. These practices are discussed in more 
detail in Section 5, but initially it may be useful 
to explain that, in general, the overseer, or water 
master, is called a mirab bashi and his assistant is 
called a mirab.
Methodology1.1 
The research is based on a literature review of 
fieldwork reports, case studies of local water 
management, and recent drafts of the WSS and the 
Water Law. In addition, fieldwork was conducted in 
Afghanistan from 5 September to 4 October 2007. 
During this period, eight provinces were visited and 
individual local mirab bashis or groups of mirab 
bashis and mirabs were interviewed prior to visiting 
1 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Draft Water Sector Strategy 2008–
2013,” Afghanistan National Development Strategy, July 2007, October 
2007 and February 2008.
2 Government of Afghanistan, Draft Water Law, July 2007, November 
2007 and June 2008.
their irrigation schemes. Questions addressed the 
mirab system, water and maintenance sharing 
between head-end, mid-end, and tail-end users 
along the main canal, and accountability (what 
is done about water theft). International staff 
members from various international social water 
management projects in different provinces were 
consulted, such as German Agro Action (GAA), 
the Kunduz River Basin Program (KRBP), and the 
Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP), 
and some of their project sites were visited. The 
choice of field visits was influenced by the local 
security situation and by the pre-selection of the 
EIRP engineers who facilitated the field visits. 
Therefore, the study sites may not be representative 
of the different provinces. In particular, larger 
canal systems (20-60 km) were chosen on many 
occasions, and visits to smaller canals (under 6 km) 
were the exception. Table 1 presents an overview 
of the research schedule.
Research locations by dateTable 1. 
Province Date
Kabul 5-10 September 2007
Kapisa 11-14 September 2007
Kunduz 14-19 September 2007
Takhar 16 September 2007
Baghlan 18 September 2007
Herat 20-25 September 2007
Kabul 25-27 September 2007
Nangarhar 27-29 September 2007
Laghman 30 September – 1 October 2007
Kabul 2-4 October 2007
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the law are considered. Section 5 opens with a 
critical review of literature on local social water 
management systems in Afghanistan. It especially 
focuses on the differences in the mirab system, 
who it represents, and perceptions about water and 
maintenance sharing between communities, and 
finally the influence of the different administrative 
levels. Section 6 presents and analyses the research 
findings, again emphasising water and maintenance 
sharing between communities. In Section 7, policy 
and local reality are juxtaposed. The focus is on 
the Kunduz River Basin Program, the emphasis 
on WUAs and the current trend of small water 
infrastructure projects, their influence on the local 
communities and the experience of the Participatory 
Management of Irrigation System project. Section 8 
offers some conclusions about the implications of 
the research. 
Limiting factors to the fieldwork were security, 
the timing of the visit and cultural considerations. 
The security situation did not allow in-depth field 
visits to be undertaken, and the tight schedule 
of the visits to different provinces and irrigation 
schemes did not allow feedback loops with the local 
community. Each irrigation scheme was visited only 
once. Nevertheless, feedback loops took place in the 
form of discussions with the accompanying engineers. 
Unfortunately, the fieldwork fell within the month of 
Ramadan. Consequently, it seemed appropriate to 
conduct interviews in the field only during the morning 
and early afternoon. In addition, the fieldwork was 
conducted at the end of the agricultural season, and 
therefore the competition between farmers over 
water resources was less intense. Nevertheless, the 
differences between head-end, mid-end, and tail-
end cropping patterns were evident. 
Most of the research for this report was started in 
September 2007 and completed in October 2007. The 
first draft of this report was submitted in December 
2007. New drafts of the WSS were issued in October 
2007 and February 2008, and new drafts of the 
Water Law were issued in November 2007 and June 
2008. Those changes were incorporated in January 
2009 into the current version of this report.  
Structure of the report 1.2 
The rest of the report is structured into seven 
sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
underpinnings and gives an overview of concepts 
and critical reflections that are relevant to 
understanding the interplay between the policy 
strategy (river basin management, WUAs, water 
law) and the current local systems of social water 
management in Afghanistan. Section 3 discusses the 
background to national water policy and introduces 
the different versions of the proposed new 
water sector strategy for the irrigation sector in 
Afghanistan at the basin and local levels. Dissenting 
views, and ambiguities and inconsistencies within 
and between the different versions, are also 
considered. Section 4 deals with the proposed 
new water law, but also gives a short background 
on previous water laws. Again, dissenting voices 
as well as ambiguities and inconsistencies within 
3Water Strategy Meets Local Reality
Implementation of IWRM policies generally 
does not focus on providing water for people’s 
use but on water demand management, cost 
recovery, reallocation of water use to higher-
value users, and environmental conservation. 
It is obvious that a livelihood-centred 
IWRM approach is required and needs to be 
implemented in any effective Afghanistan 
poverty alleviation programme. Poverty 
alleviation has to be constructed on a broader 
foundation of stakeholder capacity building, 
and the emphasis should be to support 
farmers’ and other poor water users’ desires 
to achieve sustainable livelihoods.6  
River basin management and  2.1 
 multi-stakeholder platforms
Setting new water management boundaries may 
create conflicts between boundaries of river basins 
and those of political units. Bandaragoda7 argues 
that in most cases the interests of the administrative 
units dominate the interests of the hydrological 
units. There are three fundamental critiques. First, 
one can question the naturalness of hydrological 
boundaries and watersheds. Wester and Warner8 
argue that political processes determine boundaries. 
Hence, stakeholders can be included or excluded 
according to how the boundaries are drawn. No 
matter how natural the technical discourse presents 
the boundaries as being, the definition of scale is 
finally a political decision. A second critique comes 
from Barham,9 who argues that the geographic unit is 
imposed over the different forms in which societies 
6 Draft WSS, February 2008, 3.
7 D.J.A. Bandaragoda, “Framework for Institutional Analysis for 
Water Resources Management in a River Basin Context” (Working Paper 
5, International Water Management Institute, 2000).
8 P. Wester and J.F. Warner, “River Basin Management Reconsidered,” 
in Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern Africa Perspective, 
ed. A.
9 E. Barham, “Ecological Boundaries as Community Boundaries: The 
Politics of Watersheds,” Society and Natural Resources, 14 (2001): 181-
91.
Theoretical Underpinnings2. 
Irrigation systems and shared water resources are 
usually identified as common-pool resources. Ostrom 
et al.3 distinguish between two types of problems 
with common-pool resources: appropriation and 
provision. Appropriation problems relate to the 
benefits consumed by one member, which are then 
unavailable to others. Provision problems relate 
to the operation and maintenance of the resource 
delivery system. When river basins began “closing,” 
(a basin is said to close when little or no water gets 
out of the system) basin management came into 
focus, and it became evident that most rivers have 
similar problems: appropriation by one riparian 
entity (either country or province), provision 
through large-scale water infrastructure (dams), 
but also pollution problems. Interventions at one 
point in the system are likely to have third-party 
effects elsewhere in the basin. Consequently, from 
an engineering perspective, it was argued that 
the appropriate management unit for an irrigation 
system was its hydraulic boundary, and for a river, 
its basin. Today, IWRM in a river basin context is 
a widely accepted principle to address water 
management complexities: 
IWRM is defined as a process that “promotes the 
co-ordinated development and management 
of water, land, and related resources in 
order to maximise the resultant economic 
and social welfare in an equitable manner 
without compromising the sustainability of 
vital ecosystems.4
The emphasis in the WSS is on IWRM. While the 
July 2007 Draft WSS5 focused more on economical 
approaches (water pricing), the February 2008 Draft 
WSS emphasised welfare and a livelihood approach. 
3 E. Ostrom, R. Gardener and J. Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-
Pool Resources (Ann Arbor, MI, USA: University of Michigan Press, 
1994).
4 Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory Committee, “Integrated 
Water Resources Management,” (TAC Background Paper No. 4, 2000, 
http://www.gwpforum.org/gwp/library/TACNO4.PDF), 22.
5 Draft WSS, July 2007, 31.
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more sceptical.14  
Wade15 develops an approach in which a certain 
level of natural resource scarcity is seen as the 
major factor explaining the existence of collective 
action. He argues that the relationship between 
physical scarcity and the level of collective action 
is understood as being akin to an inverted U-shaped 
curve (see Figure 1), peaking at some medium level 
of scarcity. The essence of his argument is that if 
there is enough water or water abundance there 
is no need for cooperation, and if there is severe 
water scarcity, individual interest will prevail.
This discussion on cooperation includes only water 
sharing and not the work required to maintain the 
water management infrastructure. 
Along with the debate on irrigation management 
transfer came the debate about what kind of rights 
should be transferred to the local community. Even 
Management of Rural Resources: Common-Property Regimes,” in 
Common Property Resources: Ecology of Community-Based Sustainable 
Development, ed. F. Berkes ( London: Belhaven, 1989); M. Hobley and 
K. Shah, What Makes a Local Organisation Robust? Evidence from India 
and Nepal (ODI Natural Resource Perspective No. 11, 1996).
14 A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, “The Property Rights Paradigm,” 
The Journal of Economic History, 33 (1973): 16-27; R. Wade, Village 
Republics, Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India, 
Cambridge South Asian Studies No. 40 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987).
15 Wade, Village Republics.
have historically constructed their administrative 
units, their social interrelations and their political 
divisions. Third, Barham points out10 that “we do not 
have established social and political institutions in 
place that can assure that deliberation over these 
new rules will be broadly democratic.” 
For the implementation of IWRM, the participation 
of river basin organisations and stakeholders 
is promoted. Multi-stakeholder platforms are 
presented as neutral spaces for negotiations in 
order to solve water conflicts among different 
actors, who are all invited to participate in the 
discussion. Edmunds and Wollenberg11 argue that, 
although multi-stakeholder platforms by definition 
are presented as a space for diversity, the search for 
consensus in the implementation process eliminates 
such diversity by homogenising the discussions 
(“let’s start by finding the common interest!”). 
Moreyra and Wegerich12 argue that the questions 
of who presents what kind of data and for what 
purpose seem to cause a struggle in the agenda-
setting process of multi-stakeholder platforms. In 
addition, top-down appointed representatives do 
not actually represent all the different interests 
of the actors involved, and may not reflect the 
proportionality of the existing water allocation. 
Social water management2.2 
The first question to ask is when, and in what 
circumstances, cooperation between different 
water users is necessary. The previously mentioned 
closing of basins suggests that scarcity could be 
a relevant factor. However, it appears that there 
is no agreement on the link between scarcity and 
cooperation within the academic literature. Some 
point out that scarcity and uncertainty may lead 
to cooperation between users,13 while others are 
10 Barham, “Ecological Boundaries,” 189.
11 D. Edmunds and E. Wollenberg, “A Strategic Approach to Multi-
Stakeholder Negotiations,” Development and Change, 32 (2001): 231-
53.
12 A. Moreyra and K. Wegerich, “Multi-Stakeholder Platforms as 
Problems of Eating Out: The Case of Cerro Chapelco in Patagonia, 
Argentina” (http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/dppc/seminar/water/
seminar3/waterConsensusSeminar3-MoreyraWegerichPaper.pdf, 2005) 
(accessed March 2009).
13 C.J.N. Gibbs and D.W. Bromley, “Institutional Arrangements for 
  Relation between   Figure 1.
  scarcity and cooperation
Source: based on Wade (1987)
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horizontal equity.
The irrigation management approach of local 
communities follows their own understanding of 
equity. For example, Beccar et al.21 show how in the 
Andes local communities manage their irrigation 
system according to proportional principles (input 
of maintenance labour determines water rights). On 
the other hand, Yoder and Martin22 present in their 
Nepali case study junior and senior water rights 
of different individuals within one community and 
between different communities. Junior and senior 
water rights differ substantially, not only in terms 
of the right to water, but also in the amount of 
maintenance work that newcomers are required 
to undertake. This is similar to the practice in 
the western United States, where juniors cannot 
interfere with the established rights of a senior 
rights holder. 
Because of the different understandings of equity, 
Cremers et al.23 state that “water equity is not 
determined by fixed standards of correctness or 
equality, but based on what is locally considered 
fair.” Davidson24 goes even a step further and 
concludes, “equity is considered to lie in ‘the eye 
of the beholder.’” Given the difference in local 
perceptions of equity, institutionalising a new 
standard of equity in water management (through 
WUAs) may look to the outsider as more equitable, 
but may contravene local customs and therefore 
not be acceptable. 
21 L. Beccar, R. Boelens and P. Hoogendam, “Water Rights and 
Collective Action in Community Irrigation,” in Water Rights and 
Empowerment, ed. R. Boelens and P. Hoogendam (Assen, Netherlands: 
Koninklijke van Gorcum, 2002).
22 R. Yoder and E. Martin, “Water Rights and Equity Issues: A Case 
from Nepal,” in Searching for Equity, ed. R. Boelens and G. Davila, 
133-42 (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1998).
23 L. Cremers, M. Ooijevaar and R. Boelens, “Institutional Reform in 
the Andean Irrigation Sector: Enabling Policies for Strengthening Local 
Rights and Water Management,” Natural Resources Forum, 29 (2005): 
40.
24 B. Davidson, “A Test of Equity Theory for Marital Adjustment,” 
Social Psychology Quarterly, 47, no. 1: 39.
though in Afghanistan it is not a question of irrigation 
management transfer, local water management 
implies certain rights for the community, commonly 
referred to as the bundle of rights. Schlager and 
Ostrom16 (quoted in Meinzen-Dick and Bakker17) 
propose a classification of these bundles of rights, 
distinguishing between access, withdrawal, 
exclusion, management and alienation. Ownership 
is often conceived of as holding the full bundle of 
rights.
The concept of a bundle of rights implies equity 
between water users. Cremers et al.18 distinguish 
several levels of equity in irrigation and water 
management: 
Equitable water distribution and allocation 
among different water users and uses; equitable 
distribution of the services involved in irrigation 
development; equitable distribution of the 
added agricultural production and other benefits 
under irrigation; equitable distribution of the 
burdens and obligations related to functions 
and positions; and equitable distribution of 
the rights to participate in the decision-making 
process. 
In general, equity has two components, 
proportionality and egalitarianism. According to 
Syme et al.,19 proportionality implies that resources 
should be distributed according to people’s effort 
or “deservedness.” Egalitarianism suggests that 
everyone should be treated equally. Similarly, 
Waters20 distinguishes between vertical and 
16 E. Schlager and E. Ostrom, “Property-Rights Regimes and Natural 
Resources: A Conceptual Analysis,” Land Economics, 68, no. 3: 249-
62.
17 R. Meinzen-Dick and M. Bakker, “Water Rights and Multiple Water 
Uses: Framework and Application to Kirindi Oya Irrigation System, 
Sri Lanka” (EPTD Discussion Paper no. 59, International Food Policy 
Research Institute, Environment and Production Technology Division, 
2000).
18 L. Cremers, M. Ooijevaar and R. Boelens, “Institutional Reform in 
the Andean Irrigation Sector: Enabling Policies for Strengthening Local 
Rights and Water Management,” Natural Resources Forum, 29 (2005): 
40.
19 G.J. Syme, B.E. Nancarrow and J.A. McCreddin, “Defining the 
Components of Fairness in the Allocation of Water to Environmental 
and Human Uses,” Journal of Environmental Management, 57 (1999): 
51-70.
20 H.R. Waters, “Measuring Equity in Access to Health Care,” Social 
Science and Medicine, 51 (2000): 599-612.
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anticipated arrangements for all river basins in 
Afghanistan, they state, “It seems clear that the 
project design is informed more by global notions 
of irrigation development/reform policy than 
by an analysis and understanding of the Kunduz 
region’s specific characteristics and issues,” and 
specifically, “The KRBP uses a blueprint of the river 
basin organisational framework, developed mostly 
by foreign consultants.”27 Osenberg commented on 
this critique: 
There might be some truth in this, yet the 
river basin approach was choice during a Kabul 
conference in 2002, by Afghan officials and 
few foreign advisors. The final institutional 
model was chosen in September 2004 in 
series of workshops in the Kunduz basin and 
MIWRE as the best of 5 different possibilities. 
It has subsequently been adapted on basis of 
requests from the MIWRE deputy minister in 
November 2004 and has gone through a number 
of revisions. In April 2005 it was presented by 
the Director General Water Management in a 
two days large multi stakeholder conference 
in Kunduz. More than 80 mirabs formed part 
of this conference and have been commenting 
on it through small group works.28 
Different versions of the Water  3.3 
 Sector Strategy 2007-08
In this section, three different drafts of the Water 
Sector Strategy are analysed (July 2007, October 
2007 and February 2008).29  
27 P. P. Mollinga, K. Mielke, J. Monsees, C. Schetter, U. Shah and B. 
ter Steege, “Water, War and Reconstruction: Irrigation Management 
in the Kunduz Region, Afghanistan” (paper presented at “The Last 
Drop?” Water, Security and Sustainable Development in Central Eurasia 
International Conference, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague 1-2 
December 2006), 8.
28 Walter Osenberg (Project Manager, Welt Hunger Hilfe), review 
comments on this report.
29 Walter Osenberg (Project Manager, Welt Hunger Hilfe), review 
comments on this report. In reviewing this report, Osenberg 
Water Policy 3. 
This section discusses past policies as well as recent 
and present draft strategies in relation to the water 
sector in Afghanistan. 
Background to national policies3.1 
The following is a summary of the history of water 
sector policy in Afghanistan from the 1960s to the 
present, summarizing the various steps and events 
that helped form the water sector before and after 
2001.25 (See Box 1, over page).   
In 2001, at the time of the international community’s 
intervention, state institutions were weak or 
nonexistent after 24 years of war and instability, 
and the country lagged severely behind in terms of 
water management policies, laws and regulations. 
This legacy is still apparent and should be taken 
into account when policies and institutions are 
being established. Institutional memory remains in 
the hands of a few people, and written material 
covering this history is scarce.
Critical voices on water sector  3.2 
 strategy or policy
Anderson appears to be positive about the creation 
of sub basin agencies and river basin agencies 
(RBAs). He points to the bottom-up nature of 
the new organisations (“these authorities will be 
elected from WUAs and other stakeholders”), and 
he sees the river basin approach as a “significant 
step.” His only concern is about the time frame, 
because “it assumes that mirab associations will 
be formed.”26 Mollinga et al. have a very critical 
view of the basin approach. Even though they do 
not analyse the draft law or policy but just present 
one version of the organisational chart of the 
25 N. Riviere, “Lesson Learning from the Transition between Relief 
and Development in Afghanistan—Water Sector Review” (Groupe 
Urgence, Réhabilitation, Développement, 2005).
26 Anderson, “Irrigation Systems,” 7 and 8.
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draft. Given the decline in irrigated area during the 
last 40 years and the high potential for irrigable 
land, it is not surprising that water strategy is driven 
by an ambitious plan to improve, rehabilitate and re-
establish irrigation areas. Table 2 shows the planned 
hectarage presented in the Draft WSS of July 2007.
The Draft WSS of February 2008 gives detailed 
information on major infrastructure projects that 
have been identified for implementation and in 
some cases already started (See Annex 1). As 
justification for these projects, it states that “the 
needs of the population and the growth in the 
economy of Afghanistan will require continued and 
accelerated implementation of projects.”34  It is 
not clear whether the projects are based on older 
or new feasibility studies. 
An earlier draft (July 2007) was very critical of 
the same water management projects. The July 
draft states, “Sociological and environmental 
considerations tend to nullify much of the planning 
study selection criteria upon which most of these 
34 Draft WSS, February 2008, 34.
The strategic vision of the July 2007 Draft Water 
Sector Strategy paraphrases the Afghan institutional 
baseline viewpoint, which emphasises improving 
livelihoods. Even though it is argued that the new 
strategic vision makes the statement simpler, 
the new statement emphasises development and 
management of the water sector, which will lead 
to improved livelihoods. It states that it will do the 
following:
Improve through the development and 
management of the water sector, the 
livelihoods and sources of income of the Afghan 
people; provide access to safe drinking water; 
guarantee against food insecurity; protect 
against droughts and floods; and maintain a 
sustainable bio-diversity.30 
Hence, the emphasis is on development and 
management of water resources, the assumption 
being that this will lead to improved livelihoods.
The February 2008 Draft WSS31 puts more direct 
emphasis on poverty reduction. “Poverty remains 
a core issue for Afghanistan ... Contribution of 
the Water Sector to poverty alleviation therefore 
becomes of paramount importance.” 
The Water Sector Strategy and development
By the mid-1970s 3.3 million ha of agricultural 
land was under irrigation. Presently in Afghanistan, 
about 1.8 million ha of irrigated land is cultivated.32 
According to the July 2007 Draft WSS33,  the FAO has 
estimated that there is the potential for five million 
ha of irrigable land in Afghanistan. This estimate 
was not, however, restated in the February 2008 
commented, “The different draft WSSs are not really a strategy yet 
and suffer from the different viewpoints of the various donors and 
national institutes. For example, the first version was made by USAID 
without much consultation. Furthermore, the February Draft was 
mainly meant for the Paris conference (June 2008). It is also because 
of course the ministries want tangible results to show to the people. 
The WSSs are too much an investment plan and not really a strategy.” 
On the other hand, he also stated, “Many of the versions of WSS and 
law were for comments and internal circulation only.”
30 Draft WSS, July 2007, 36. All WSS quotations use the official English 
translation provided by the Government of Afghanistan.
31 Draft WSS, February 2008, 3.
32 Draft WSS, February 2008, 24.
33 Draft WSS, July 2007, 24.
Strategy for development of irrigationTable 2. 
Year Improve or 
rehabilitate 
existing 
irrigation areas
Re-establish 
irrigation areas
2004 50,000 ha 20,000 ha
2005 150,000 ha 30,000 ha
2006 150,000 ha 50,000 ha
2007 150,000 ha 50,000 ha
2008 150,000 ha 50,000 ha
2009 150,000 ha 40,000 ha
2010 150,000 ha
2011 150,000 ha
2012 150,000 ha
2013 50,000 ha
Source: Draft WSS, July 2007, 39.
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A Timeline of Water Strategy in AfghanistanBox 1. 
1960s and 70s: 
Construction and establishment of formal and large multi purpose irrigation schemes with the 
development of hydropower.
1971-72: 
Split within the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI) between agriculture and irrigation. A 
department is created to survey soil and water, then a general directorate, which finally became an 
independent Ministry of Water and Power (MWP).Finally, at the end of the nineteen seventies, the MWP 
was in charge of administering the irrigation and hydropower sub-sectors, the RDD (Rural Development 
Department) was responsible for the water supply and sanitation sector and the traditional irrigation 
systems, and the Ministry of Public Works controlled the urban water sanitation. The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Animal Husbandry and Food (MAAHF) could keep on influencing research work on the 
irrigation and water management topics within its research department.
1981: 
Creation and adoption of the water law that combined customary laws or principles, and new principles 
and inputs brought in by the Soviet regime. 
1988: 
The Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment (MIWRE) is created in addition to the 
MWP in order to manage hydrological networks, the development of water resources, and large-scale 
irrigation facilities. During this period, the MAAHF, and the agriculture sector as a whole, were relieved 
of the majority of their responsibilities on irrigation and water management, even though the largest 
proportion of water consumption goes towards agricultural activities. The division between irrigation 
and the Ministry of Agriculture created an institutional gap on water management. As a result of the 
strong influence of the Soviet regime, the institutions created for managing water resources and 
irrigation have focused their work and influence mostly on civil engineering aspects, omitting the 
overall water management issues and their role in agriculture. The nineteen seventies and eighties 
were marked by serious tensions and conflicts among the Afghan institutions. NGOs were mostly in 
charge of the rehabilitation and construction of canals/karez, via UN-led programs (Food for Work 
or Quick Impact Project implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services, World Food 
Program, FAO, or other agencies). 
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Post 2001: 
Pressure and/or high expectations from donors and communities persuaded some NGOs to expand the 
surface area of irrigated land. The extension of primary canals, creation of surface irrigation schemes, 
diverting water from rivers, development of groundwater irrigation with the construction of wells equipped 
with motor pumps, drainage of wet and barren zones unfit for agriculture have taken place. The overall 
results and outputs vary according the programs and the implementing NGOs. In many cases, the ex-ante 
evaluations did not sufficiently take into consideration technical specificities and requirements, as well as 
socio-economic and environmental conditions and long-term effects.
April 2002: National Development Framework by the transition Government.
May 2002: Kabul Understanding on Water Resource Management & Development in Afghanistan workshop 
by MIWRE and UNICEF
2002-03: Country divided up into five river basins, pivot of the new IWRP policy by AIMS (Afghan Information 
Management Service) and FAO; editing of the watershed atlas of Afghanistan 
January 2004: Management and Development of Water Resources and Environment in Afghanistan seminar 
by MIWRE and FAO
2004-05: Strategy Policy Framework for Water Sector drafted and amended
2004-05: Sub-sectors policies drafted Water Resource Management Policy and Strategy and Irrigation 
Policy.
Mid-2004: Start of the Kunduz River Basin Programme (KRBP) seen at the Ministry of Energy and Water 
(MEW) and at the institutional level as a pilot experience on the implementation and development of river 
basin management - the concept of integrated management of the country’s water resources that forms 
the basis for the new water policy.
Dec. 2004: Merger of the MWP and MIWRE to MEW;
June 2005 NGO Law: The new NGO law was an effort to reduce the number of for-profit companies operating 
as NGOs. Consequently, the construction and rehabilitation of schemes and research on water management 
is not conducted by NGOs. However, along with their operational work in various parts of the country, some 
NGOs, such as DACAAR, GAA, Solidarités, ACTED, AREU, etc., have continued to play an important role 
within the (sub-) sector and the Water and Sanitation Group (WSG). 
Source: N. Riviere, “Lesson Learning from the Transition between Relief and Development in Afghanistan – 
Water Sector Review” (Group Urgence, Rehabilitation, Développement, 2005)
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as a 2004 MIWRE report states,39  is unfair, then the 
EIRP would be perpetuating unfair local practices.40 
While the July 2007 Draft WSS mentioned 
hydropower production only in the context of large 
infrastructure, the October 2007 draft incorporated 
micro-hydropower plants at the local level. It 
stated:41 
Several rural areas are too remote for 
connection to the national electricity grid. 
Micro-hydropower plants in areas with 
sustainable resources of water can function 
as proper alternative to optimise the 
electrification of remote rural areas. Power 
generation within irrigation schemes is 
another alternative.
The February 2008 draft further emphasises micro-
hydropower plants as a solution for rural areas:42  
In principle, rural areas are often much 
too remote for connection to the national 
electrical grid. Micro-hydropower plants in 
areas with sustainable water resources can 
therefore function as effective alternatives 
to provide electrification to rural areas. 
Power generation facilities constructed 
within irrigation schemes can also sometimes 
become viable alternatives.
In principle micro-hydropower plants are 
nonconsumptive users of water; therefore, to put 
an emphasis on local electricity production through 
micro-hydropower plants can be considered very 
positive. However, the nonconsumptive nature of 
micro-hydropower plants within an irrigation system 
and for a particular WUA depends on the location of 
the plant.43  In any case, where a micro-hydropower 
39 Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment (MIWRE), 
“A Strategic Policy Framework for the Water Sector” (Kabul: Ministry 
of Irrigation, Water Resources, and Environment, 2004).
40 It was argued in irrigation departments in Kunduz and Herat that 
the infrastructures of the local water distribution systems had not 
been changed but only improved and made more permanent. See an 
analysis of these kinds of projects below.
41 Draft WSS, October 2007, 30.
42 Draft WSS, February 2008, 25.
43 See an analysis of specific micro-hydropower plants below.
former studies have been based.”35 Sociological 
considerations include the return of refugees who 
are now living in areas that had been previously 
considered for water developments. For example: 
In the recent MEW plans to elevate the Kajakai 
Reservoir, socio-environmental assessments 
discovered that an estimated 45,000 people 
now inhabit lands within the reservoir area, 
which had been formerly acquired thirty 
years earlier by the GOA [Government of 
Afghanistan].36 
These critical remarks are not restated or addressed 
in the February 2008 draft. Hence, it is questionable 
whether all the projects the draft identifies are 
feasible and as beneficial as estimated in terms of 
irrigation or hydropower, or whether they can be 
carried out without negative consequences. 
It is likely that the focus on irrigation and dam 
development is negatively influencing neighbouring 
countries. For example, the Upper Amu Darya 
project, which started in 2008, anticipates the 
development of 500,000 ha of agricultural land. 
However, today the Amu Darya basin is already 
“closed” and sends hardly any water to the Aral 
Sea. (For additional discussion of river basin 
management, see the next section.) 
It is not clear whether identified projects are 
new developments or rehabilitations of existing 
irrigation systems. The July 2007 Draft WSS stated, 
“Currently the World Bank (WB) has been funding 
the Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project 
(EIRP). Focus of this programme is primarily on 
traditional irrigation schemes.”37 EIRP’s focus on 
local systems may be contradictory to the aims 
of the WSS, which assumes that the local systems 
are “badly fragmented,” “often ineffective” and 
“dysfunctional.”38 (These remain assumptions, 
however, because there has been no detailed study 
of the issue.) If the mirab system does not function 
and only represents part of the local population, or, 
35 Draft WSS, July 2007, 20.
36 Draft WSS, July 2007, 20.
37 Draft WSS, July 2007, 38.
38 Draft WSS, February 2008, 1 and 12.
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of these basins, and the needs of stakeholders in 
neighbouring countries, are not recognized in the 
proposed structure of the RBAs and RBCs, they 
are not basin but rather sub-basin authorities and 
councils, their territory limited by the political 
boundaries of the state of Afghanistan. The national 
emphasis was even highlighted in the July Draft and 
the transbounday concerns strongly raised in the 
October Draft WSS: 
Because of Afghanistan’s innate land locked 
setting, virtually all of Afghanistan’s major 
rivers drain off into riparian neighboring states. 
Transboundary concerns are intensifying from 
all of Afghanistan’s borders. These concerns 
are like a snowball rolling downhill, and 
with the added impetus of climate change 
and diminishing glaciers, the buildup in 
momentum of this problem can no longer be 
avoided. Afghanistan has been preoccupied 
with so many other problems, it has not 
had either adequate resources or sufficient 
time to thoroughly address and study these 
problems. Afghanistan requires solid support 
from the donor/financing community to study 
and add dimension to both its current and 
future water requirements. Upon definition, 
Afghanistan can approach its neighbors on 
Resources and Peace Building workshop, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 23-27 
April 2005).
plant consumes water from a canal, it would have 
to be recognised as a water user both in the law 
and within the WUAs. A recent report44 recognised 
other users besides farmers within WUAs, but only if 
they use more than ten percent of the water, which 
might not be the case with one micro-hydropower 
plant or rice mill. Hence, even in the current WUA 
framework, they are not included. 
Social water management at the basin level
The different WSS drafts include plans for the 
establishment of river basin authorities (RBAs) and 
river basin councils (RBCs). The July 2007 draft WSS 
even identifies basins, as shown in Map 1, as well as 
sub-basins, as shown in Map 2.
Even though RBAs, RBCs and hydrological 
boundaries are supposed to be nonpolitical, it 
appears that the very nature is political. Four of 
the five river basins identified in Afghanistan are 
transboundary basins that contribute surface water 
to neighbouring countries. (The one exception 
is the so-called Northern River basin; it may, 
however, contribute groundwater to the Amu Darya 
River basin.)45 Because the transboundary natures 
44 Development Alternatives Inc., “Water Users Associations (WUAs) 
in Afghanistan Report” (Report for RAMP/USAID, Job Order #44, 
2006).
45 M.Q. Naimi, “Conflict Prevention and the Politics of Central Asia 
Water Cooperation from the Point of View of Afghanistan” (paper 
presented at University of Peace, Central Asia Program, Regional Water 
Watershed Map of AfghanistanMap 2. 
Source: Draft WSS, July 2007, 19.
River Basins of AfghanistanMap 1. 
Source: Draft WSS, July 2007, 22.
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an equal footing, and it can then participate 
in achieving optimal efficiency in regional 
development of these waterways.46 
Discussion of river basins in the July 2007 Draft WSS 
had a national emphasis, and the transboundary 
concerns were strongly raised in the October 
2007 draft. The transboundary concerns are not 
mentioned in the Draft WSS of February 2008, 
where the focus is strictly on the national level 
without mentioning implications for downstream 
riparian states.
Figure 2 illustrates how the different versions of 
the WSS determine the structure of the river basin 
organisations.
From Figure 2 it appears that the Ministry of 
Energy and Water (MEW) plays a central role in 
determining the river basin agency and that the 
river basin council is based on a bottom-up process. 
Nevertheless, the February 2008 Draft WSS is not 
specific about the ministry’s role, stating only that 
“the national bodies will provide the necessary 
support and know-how through the River Basin 
Agencies.”47  
The February 2008 draft identifies the different 
46 Draft WSS, October 2007, 9.
47 Draft WSS, February 2008, 21.
“line ministry and agency responsibilities of 
those entities directly involved with water sector 
activities.”48 However, the focus is on agency-
specific functions rather than on how, and on what 
specific issues, these entities would collaborate. 
While detailed aspects of the functions, roles, and 
procedures of the RBAs were not spelled out in the 
July 2007 draft, the February 2008 draft assigns 
“administrative, advisory and executive tasks related 
to irrigation, water resources and infrastructure 
management” to the river basin agency and 
“decision-making” to the river basin councils.49  
The July 2007 Draft WSS noted several challenges 
to implementing the RBA/RBC system, saying 
that it “will need to gradually mould itself to 
serve the specifics in jurisdictional parameters 
as encountered” and that “it will take time 
and resources to put the respective water and 
infrastructure databases for the RBAs into place.”50 
“Also, not until an effective governance system is 
re-established in outlying provinces can any law 
become effective.”51   
Involvement of stakeholders in developing 
countries into an effective integrated water 
resources management (IWRM) mechanism is 
thwarted principally by lack of education and 
mechanisms, which again are deflected by the 
hardship associated with poverty.52   
Sustainable planning processes in developing 
countries such as Afghanistan need to initially 
overcome the following:
Fragmented institutional setups• 
Institutional implementation bottlenecks• 
Lack of human resources or capacity• 
Ministries inherently opposed to planning • 
concepts or implementation of programs 
(turf battles), and
48 Draft WSS, February 2008, 11.
49 Draft WSS, February 2008, 29.
50 Draft WSS, July 2007, 7.
51 Draft WSS, July 2007, 11.
52 Draft WSS, July 2007, 30.
 River basin organizational structureFigure 2.
Source: Vincent Thomas, updated from Draft 
WSS, October 2007, 20; this figure is not included 
in the February 2008 draft.
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financial resources to permit compliance with 
regulations and policies as well as facilitate 
necessary expansion ... Likewise, technical 
capacity implies also having the physical 
infrastructure to permit implementation of 
programmes and projects.
The July 2007 draft did not mention local 
stakeholders, focusing only on national and 
international players involved in river basin 
organisations.58 The February draft mentions 
“Water User Associations and other stakeholders, 
including women”59 as members for basin and sub-
basin councils. The role of traditional shuras and 
mirabs in water management is only mentioned in 
reference to the absence of basin and sub-basin 
councils. Having stated this, based on Figure 2 it 
appears that mirab associations, shuras, jirgas 
and other community associations are anticipated 
to be in the councils. One important question is 
how mirab associations are defined. The traditional 
mirab system is perceived as being dysfunctional, 
but in Figure 2 the alternative, WUAs, are not 
mentioned at all.
The July draft WSS states: “Effective river basin 
management can be expected to take decades to 
transpire. Current endeavours should therefore be 
accepted as pilot programmes forming the nucleus 
of future RBAs.” It goes on to say, “Before adopting 
any legislation, it is wise to test the logistics, 
implementability, and enforceability of drafted 
legislation.”60 Hence, it may be useful to look at 
current pilot projects to get a better understanding 
of what is happening and who is represented on 
the current platforms.61 Even so, it is questionable 
whether that will yield a reliable prediction of 
what may follow on a countrywide level. As the 
July 2007 draft acknowledges,62 “Afghanistan is 
not a homogenous physical entity ... Experiences 
learned in one area of the country may be totally 
inapplicable elsewhere.” 
58 Draft WSS, July 2007, 69.
59 Draft WSS, February 2008, 20.
60 Draft WSS, July 2007, 54 and 42.
61 A closer look at the Kunduz River Basin Program and its working 
group is presented below.
62 Draft WSS, July 2007, 45.
Poorly coordinated or organised • 
administrative entities
Lack of effective governance mechanisms• 53  
Because of the vastly different environmental • 
conditions in Afghanistan’s different regional 
settings, comprehensive implementation of 
RBAs may never materialise.54 
The focus in the different WSS drafts on RBAs and 
RBCs appears positive as it highlights the importance 
of user and stakeholder participation. However, it 
is not  evident how this is supposed to be achieved. 
“The water sector can achieve total user and 
stakeholder participation is of real importance. How 
the sector gets there is of secondary consideration. 
Instituting RBAs will take time and resources.”55  The 
February 2008 draft omits these critical comments, 
but it does raise other concerns: data availability 
and capacity. 
To cope with the lack of skilled and experienced 
human resources, the February 2008 draft 
looks to NGOs and universities for help. It 
gives emphasis to NGOs, which could facilitate 
stakeholder participation at the community level 
and therefore in RBCs. Nevertheless, this does 
not address the internal problems of the RBAs. 
The February 2008 draft says that the water 
sector is “impaired by a shortage of adequately 
experienced and trained staff” and thus a long-
term strategy of capacity building at universities 
and colleges is needed.56  
At the same time, the February 2008 draft 
points out that not only human capacity is 
necessary:57   
Capacity development is not only limited 
to human capability, but extends to having 
overall capability in three areas: financial, 
technical, and managerial. Having financial 
capacity implies that the sector has the 
capability to acquire and manage sufficient 
53 Draft WSS, July 2007, 31
54 Draft WSS, July 2007, 43.
55 Draft WSS, July 2007, 45.
56 Draft WSS, February 2008, 15.
57 Draft WSS, February 2008, 33.
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WSS of July 2007 appears to have ignored these studies 
when it argued, “Afghanistan has been preoccupied 
with so many other problems, it has not had either 
adequate resources or sufficient time to thoroughly 
address and study these problems.”69 Arguably, the 
above-mentioned studies are not thorough and 
have their limits. They include comparative studies 
in different provinces70 and a more in-depth study 
along two canals in Kunduz Province.71 All of these 
studies had to take into consideration local security 
situations that influenced the choice of the study 
area, and had the additional disadvantage that the 
study areas were chosen by NGOs to support other 
programmes. They are nonetheless informative and 
should have triggered more thorough studies before 
any water strategy or law was drafted. At least, 
they should have informed the drafts of the WSS. 
The most recent draft, of February 2008, makes no 
statement about the need for further studies and 
gives the impression that that the dysfunctionality 
of the traditional mirab system is an established 
fact. 
The drafts of July 2007 and February 2008 describe 
the dysfunction of the traditional mirab system as 
follows: 
Water resources were typically managed 
by a Mirab (water master) who was elected 
by farmers ... Extensive years of conflict 
damaged this traditional governance 
structure, and today governance is not 
only badly fragmented, but it is often 
ineffective...Recognizing this plight, there is 
strong governmental incentive to re-establish 
local level governance structures with WUAs. 
Through this mechanism, vestiges of direct 
stakeholder (community) participation are 
the goal.72 
and Water Distribution in the Asqalan and Sufi-Qarayateem Canal 
Irrigation Systems in the Kunduz River Basin” (Amu Darya Series 
Paper No. 5, SMWA Paper No. II, Center for Development Research, 
2006, http://131.220.109.9/fileadmin/webfiles/downloads/projects/
amudarya/publications/ZEF_Working_Paper_Amu_Darya_Series_30.
pdf) (accessed March 2009).
69 Draft WSS, July 2007, 7.
70 Lee, “Social Water Management”; Lee,” Performance of Community 
Water Management Systems”; Anderson, “Irrigation Systems.”
71 ter Steege, “Infrastructure and Water Distribution.”
72 Draft WSS, July 2007, 10.
The February 2008 draft does not raise these 
concerns, but states positively, “Experience gained 
from this major pilot project [KRBP] will help pave 
the way for implementing additional RBO [river 
basin organization] undertakings throughout the 
country in a progressive manner.”63 
Social water management at the local level
The different versions of the WSS are based on an 
assumption similar to that expressed in MIWRE’s 2004 
water strategy, “The local and traditional water 
distribution and water rights systems have been 
weakened, and...therefore upstream-downstream 
conflicts have been intensified with the result 
of unfair distribution.”64 Despite this sweeping 
statement, it appears that after the fall of the 
Taliban and before 2004 there was no countrywide 
study on social water management.65 MIWRE was 
likely influenced by the negative findings of more 
localized studies.66  
Although the 2004 strategy was pessimistic about 
the effectiveness of local systems, it nevertheless 
retained the local concepts, thereby acknowledging 
that not all local systems have been disrupted, calling 
for “support to and promotion of local, regional 
and inter-provincial institutions and community-
based organisations, such as Mirabs, Shuras, and 
promotion of similar water user associations.”67 
Findings  from  research mirab systems conducted 
later are quite positive and encouraging.68 The Draft 
63 Draft WSS, February 2008, 1.
64 MIWRE, “A Strategic Policy Framework for the Water Sector,” 7. 
There might be one misconception within the statement. It implies 
that the local water management system is now unfair and that the 
earlier system was fair. For an analysis of the local system, see the 
next section.
65 Whether there were studies before that is unclear, because the 
public libraries have been burned, and today it is difficult to find older 
documents.
66 One such study is J.L. Lee, “Water Resource Management on the 
Balkh Ab River and Hazhda Nahr Canal Network: From Crisis to Collapse.” 
(For further discussion of this, see Section 5 of this report.)
67 MIWRE, “A Strategic Policy Framework for the Water Sector,” 10.
68 J.L. Lee, “Water Management, Livestock and the Opium 
Economy: Social Water Management” (Kabul : Afghanistan Research 
and Evaluation Unit, 2006); J.L. Lee, “Water Management, Livestock 
and the Opium Economy: The Performance of Community Water 
Management Systems” (Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, 
2007); Anderson, “Irrigation Systems”; B. ter Steege, “Infrastructure 
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water allocations established between and within 
the canal communities. 
There might be a romantic belief about local water 
management systems that in the mirab system 
farmers had an equitable (or maybe even equal) 
right to water. As the fieldwork data presented 
in Section 6 will show, existing social water 
management systems are not necessary equitable; 
therefore, the demand for social equity may be at 
variance with existing local water management.
Water charges for agriculture 
The message concerning local water management 
is twofold. On the one hand, the February 2008 
draft clearly states, “Poverty alleviation has to be 
constructed on a broader foundation of stakeholder 
capacity building, and the emphasis should be to 
support farmers’ and other poor water users’ desires 
to achieve sustainable livelihoods.”80 On the other 
hand, it was clearly stated in the July 2007 draft: 
“Water has an economic value in all its • 
competing uses and should be recognised as 
an economic good.”81  
“Define secure and transferable (tradable) • 
water rights for possibilities of improving 
economic efficiencies.”82  
“Develop water pricing which realistically • 
reflects cost recovery mechanisms.”83  
The February 2008 draft no longer emphasises 
water pricing and water as an economic good. 
However, it does still set as long-term objectives 
full cost recovery for water services from users and 
financial autonomy for RBAs and other public utility 
organisations.84  
It will become evident in Section 5 that the 
suggestions in the July 2007 Draft WSS are at variance 
80 Draft WSS, February 2008, 3.
81 Draft WSS, July 2007, 33.
82 Draft WSS, July 2007, 41.
83 Draft WSS, July 2007, 41.
84 Draft WSS, February 2008, 31.
WUAs will, in many regions of the country, 
supplant the traditional governance 
mechanisms, which have long since become 
dysfunctional.73 
The July 2007 Draft WSS sees the current donor-
established community development councils 
(CDCs) as a platform for WUAs, and even mentions 
internationally promoted bylaws for WUAs.74 
Similarly, the February 2008 draft mentions the 
2002 international conference that “laid the 
foundation for development of the water sector in 
Afghanistan.”75 At this conference, regulations for 
WUAs were determined. The July 2007 draft argued 
that “these associations were expected to improve 
water conservation techniques and increase 
efficiency in water use.”76 The February 2008 draft 
presented similar reasoning. 
However, there seems to be still quite some 
ambiguity in terms of the establishment of WUAs and 
the traditional local water management system. The 
July 2007 draft stated, “The Provincial governments 
and rural communities are recommended to set 
up water management institutions (WUAs) and/or 
traditional governance systems.”77 The February 
2008 draft states, “Water User Associations based 
on traditional Mirab system have been formed by 
water users [from 2007 onward].”78  Nevertheless, 
the mirab system, as will be shown below, differs 
from the internationally promoted WUAs. 
In addition, contradictory to statements about 
the “dysfunctional” mirab system is the following 
statement: “Water law and policy should formally 
recognise the validity and legitimacy of local 
community-based water arrangements, so long 
as these are in compliance with constitutional 
imperatives and principles of human rights.”79 It 
is not clear whether “community-based water 
arrangements” refers to the mirab system or the 
73 Draft WSS, February 2008, 1.
74 Draft WSS, July 2007, 12 and 13.
75 Draft WSS, February 2008, 12.
76 Draft WSS, July 2007, 7.
77 Draft WSS, July 2007, 70.
78 Draft WSS, February 2008, 14.
79 Draft WSS, July 2007, 42; restated in Draft WSS, February 2008, 1.
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with customary systems. It is unclear why that draft 
retained traditional governance systems as part of 
the strategy. It may suggest the possibility of having 
two water management systems side by side, with 
traditional irrigation systems in existing irrigated 
areas and a different system in newly irrigated 
areas. Since full cost recovery is only stated as a 
long-term objective, this might not conflict with the 
current emphasis on poverty alleviation. However, it 
should influence the construction of new irrigation 
systems and critically reflect whether they could 
remain economically viable when the policy of cost 
recovery is implemented.
17
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The 1991 law explicitly states that water rights can 
be taken away if they are surplus to requirements.92 
The 1981 law, on the other hand, determined the 
exact water right per jerib and therefore only 
implicitly stated that additional water will be 
redistributed.93 
Under both laws, the chief water supervisor (mirab 
bashi) and assistant (mirab)94 are responsible for 
water distribution. Both laws state that during 
the election of these officials and at the general 
assembly meetings, the local government organ95 
and the Water Management and Agricultural 
departments96 should officiate. In addition, even 
though the mirab bashi and mirab should receive 
their wages from the farmers, both laws state that 
the “Ministry of Water and Power will reward and 
will pay bonuses to them.”97  In this sense, the state 
has direct influence on the local water manager and 
water distribution. 
In both laws, the higher administrative levels 
are responsible for dispute resolution98 between 
the irrigation systems; therefore, it appears that 
water is supposed to be managed according to 
administrative boundaries at higher levels. 
Article 13 of the 1981 Law concerning the use of 
water in agriculture appears to have been very much 
ahead of its time and remains very important for 
today’s regulation in relation to micro hydropower 
plants. It states:
“Flour mills operated by water and non-
agricultural organisations can get the water 
92 Water Law 1991, Article 25.
93 Water Law 1981, Article 17.
94 Water Law 1981, Article 27; Water Law 1991 Article 27 and 28.
95 Water Law 1981, Article 24.
96 Water Law 1991, Article 33.
97 Water Law 1991, Article 31; Water Law 1981, Article 22.
98 Water Law 1981, Article 40; Water Law 1991, Article 50.
Water Law4. 
This section discusses the current Draft Water Law 
against the backdrop of previous legislation.
The water laws of 1981 and  4.1 
 1991
There are many similarities between the water 
laws of 1981 and 1991, but the 1981 law was 
more specific than the 1991 law.85 Both laws state 
that water belongs to the people and that the 
government protects it.86 Perhaps it is because of 
this that water is free of charge.87  
Whereas the 1981 law stated that water distribution 
should be “just and equitable,”88 the 1991 law 
only mentions “proper distribution.”89 The 1981 
law went so far as to state that water rights 
should be determined for each jerib (a jerib is 
one-fifth of a hectare or 2,000 square meters).90 
However, whether this implies a fixed amount is 
questionable, and whether the state had the ability 
to determine the amount is doubtful. The 1981 law 
stated, “The amount of water needed for irrigation 
shall be determined according to the area under 
cultivation, the kind of crop, the irrigation regime, 
the water rights documents, the local practice and 
the amount of water in its resource.”91 The first 
part of this article reads like the principles that 
the Soviet Union applied in Central Asia; however, 
the addition of the phrase “local practice” leaves 
it flexible and open to interpretation.  
85 It is questionable whether the 1981 law was ever implemented, 
since the 1980s and 1990s were the time of the Russian invasion and 
the mujahiddin period. Nevertheless, one could also argue that the 
1981 law was a reflection of the Daoud period (1970-1980). During 
this period the influence of the government and the Agricultural 
Department was very strong in the rural areas.
86 Water Law 1981, Article 2; Water Law 1991, Article 2.
87 Water Law 1981, Article 6; Water Law 1991, Article 6.
88 Water Law 1981, Article 14.
89 Water Law 1991, Article 19.
90 Water Law 1981, Article 17.
91 Water Law 1981, Article 6.
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In urban water supply ... With respect to 
governance, new water law legislation is being 
prepared, environmental regulations have 
already been legislated, and enforcement 
capabilities are being established through the 
Ministry of the Interior. In the rural sector, 
governance is also being redressed through 
the establishment of Community Development 
Councils (CDCs) under the National Solidarity 
Program (NSP).100
Comments such as these put into question the 
enforceability of the proposed new water law 
in the rural areas. Furthermore, a reference is 
made to Community Development Councils, as 
the analysis of the draft water law will highlight: 
councils are only mentioned at the basin and sub-
basin level, but only with decision-making capacity. 
Enforcement is left with the Basin Agency, hence 
with the government. 
In general terms, the drafts of the WSS emphasise 
the opportunities the water law gives to the end-
user. 
The Water Law provides significant 
opportunities for “end-user” and include 
participation in decision-making relating to (1) 
water resources, planning, implementation 
and management; (2) operation and 
maintenance of water supply systems and 
services; and (3) determinations of water use 
allocations. All rights of “end-users” in these 
processes are described in the Water Law.101 
The analysis of the draft law will show whether it 
provides significant opportunities for the end-users 
and what those opportunities are. 
Analysis of the Draft Water Law  4.3 
 (of June 2008)
The Draft Water Law has been approved by 
Parliament and by the Senate but still needs to be 
approved by the President. It is not clear whether 
100 Draft WSS, February 2008,  2.
101 Draft WSS, February 2008, 16.
they need from the main or subsidiary canals 
under the following conditions:
if there exists in the canal some surplus 1. 
of water;
 2. if the lands under irrigation and the 
residential are not affected;
 3. if the water for drinking is not polluted 
and its quality not changed; and
 4. special permits shall be necessary from 
the organs of the Ministry of Water 
and Electricity in agreement with 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Reform.”
Critical voices on the revised draft 4.2 
 versions of the 1991 Water Law 
Although the July 2007 Draft WSS emphasises 
the importance of the law, it also highlights the 
difficulties of implementing the law:99  
Unlike the social-political situation that 
existed in the past, strict enforcement 
of any enacted water law may present an 
immediate problem in the rural areas of the 
country. Not until an effective governance 
system is re-established in outlying Provinces 
can any law become effective. These 
enforcement constraints are expected to 
influence and diminish the development of 
desired achievements: Their resolutions are 
extremely time dependent as the Ministry 
of Interior re-establishes a national policing 
capacity.
The February 2008 Draft WSS is not that explicit, 
it only mentions the ongoing process. However, it 
makes a clear distinction between urban and rural 
areas. Enforcement is only mentioned for the urban 
areas, while for the rural areas the only reference 
is to governance: 
99 Draft WSS, July 2007,  11.
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by the service provider. A separate regulation 
shall be developed for this purpose.
The focus in the Draft Water Law on the costs of 
service delivery appears to conflict with the focus 
in the most recent Draft WSS on poverty reduction. 
Article 7 implies that even the construction costs 
of the water infrastructure might have to be paid 
by the users. In that case, the costs of the water 
services could be significant. This could imply 
that only commercial farmers and not subsistence 
farmers would be able to pay for water services. 
Nonpayment for services leads directly to the loss 
of the water use right, according to Article 28 
(Paragraph 1). It is also indicative that there is no 
direct link between water rights and maintenance 
requirements as might be found in a customary 
system. 
The ambivalence between a customary system and 
a more modern system with cost recovery becomes 
more evident in Article 8.
While in Article 8, Paragraph 1 and 4, the 
responsibilities of Governmental Institutions in 
terms of planning and management on surface 
water are stated: 
Paragraph 1: • Planning, management and 
development of water resources is the 
responsibility of Ministry of Energy and Water 
(MEW) in close collaboration with concerned 
ministries and agencies.
Paragraph 4: • Identification of norm of 
irrigation in different river basins and 
researches on irrigation and drainage systems 
is responsibility of Ministry of Irrigation and 
Agriculture (MAIL) in close collaboration with 
MEW, MPH and NEPA.
In Paragraph 7 of the same Article an • 
exception is pointed out: Right-of-way for 
water resources and water infrastructures 
such as reservoirs, dams, diversions, rivers, 
traditional and engineered canals, Karezes, 
springs, wells and other water streams shall 
be protected and free from interventions that 
bring negative impact. The ministry of Energy 
it is synchronised with other draft laws or with 
existing laws, for example the environmental law. 
Most of the following comments are based on an 
informal January 2009 translation of the 2008 draft, 
and all quotations are taken from that translation. 
The final subsection, “Transboundary issues,” is 
based on the November 2007 draft.
Scope of the law
Article 1 gives the law’s purpose and objectives.
This Law is based on the values of Article 9 
of Constitution of Afghanistan to conserve/
protect water resources, to ensure fair 
distribution of water and effective and 
sustainable use of water, strengthening of 
national economy, and fulfilling the rights 
of water users considering the appropriate/
suitable water use traditions and customs in 
the country.
In previous drafts, the first article specifically 
stated that the water law should be “based on 
praiseworthy customs and traditions of the Afghan 
people.” The June 2008 draft, however, only calls 
for “fulfilling the rights of water users considering 
the appropriate/suitable water use traditions and 
customs in the country.” This suggests that there 
will be a selective process to determine which 
traditions and customs should be kept. 
Article 2 states, “Water is a public property and 
the government is responsible for facilitating its 
protection and management.” It seems that it is in 
direct contradiction to the traditional water rights 
system. Article 2 implies that there is no local right 
to water without the agreement of the state, since 
the water is the property of the state. 
While Article 6 still refers to “the best accepted 
customs and traditions,” by Article 7 this reference 
has been dropped. Article 7 states: 
Water is free, but the cost of investment 
and provision of services relating to supply, 
delivery, storage, diversion, treatment, 
operation and maintenance can be charged 
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water user associations (Article 10, paragraph 12), 
and MAIL is responsible for establishing irrigation 
associations. It appears that the term irrigation 
association will not be defined within the law’s 
terminology section (Article 3), where only the 
term water user association is mentioned. Article 
10, paragraph 6 lists MEW responsibilities as 
“building and rehabilitating main-dams, canals and 
other hydrological facilities, their maintenance 
and safety,” and Article 11, paragraph 8 lists MAIL 
responsibilities as “protecting and conserving main 
canals and active ditches.” Hence, there might be 
some overlap regarding the responsibility for main 
canals. This might be aggravated by the absence of 
a definition of the term main canal. 
Although there could be an overlap, it might 
also be possible that there is a clear distinction, 
depending on the interpretation of the terms in 
use. There appears to be a distinction regarding 
the responsibility for different irrigation systems. 
Article 10, paragraph 9, assigns to MEW “architecting 
the construction of traditional canals,” and Article 
11, paragraph 1 assigns to MAIL “rehabilitating, 
developing and protecting irrigation schemes.” 
Based on the terms in use, it appears that MEW is 
responsible for the traditional community-managed 
irrigation systems and MAIL for formal irrigation 
systems. This could also explain the different 
names of the associations, the assumption being 
that formal irrigation systems had a single purpose. 
However, this could imply, given language in Article 
11, paragraphs 2, 6 and 7, that MAIL would only 
be responsible for formal irrigation systems. These 
paragraphs state:
Paragraph 2: • Managing irrigation schemes 
together with users and maintaining fair 
allocation of water rights the system.
Paragraph 6: • Conducting studies to establish 
standards and enhance irrigations’ economic 
effectiveness.
Paragraph 7: • Mainstreaming appropriate 
irrigation technology to mitigate water 
wastage and increase the effectiveness of 
water consumption.
and Water MEW shall determine the right–
of-way area in cooperation with MAIL, MM, 
MRRD, MUD and other relevant agencies.
One has to point out, that in the terminology section 
the term “right-of-way” is not defined, neither 
are the terms traditional or engineered canal. 
Anyhow, according to the Irrigation Policy of the 
former Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and 
Environment (MIWRE) 90 percent of all the irrigated 
land in Afghanistan fall under the category of 
traditional community managed irrigation systems 
and ten percent fall under formal irrigation systems. 
The latter are government built and operated large-
scale irrigation systems with permanent diversion 
structures and well defined water distribution 
structures. Since it is makes reference to traditional 
and engineered systems it is not evident to what 
the law might apply. Furthermore, it is not evident 
what is meant with the phrase “interventions that 
bring negative impact,” it might be very doubtful, 
whether this could be determined before the 
intervention takes place, or at least it would be a 
very time intensive process. In addition, one might 
have to question a negative impact for whom, for 
the whole canal community or for some groups 
within the canal community. A negative impact 
for some (i.e. head-enders) could imply a positive 
impact for the larger majority along the canal (mid 
and tail-enders). In any case, Paragraph 7 calls for 
a detailed survey on each system. Finally, the right-
of-way Paragraph might put into question any basin 
or sub-basin approach. 
Water management organisations
The June 2008 Draft Water Law mentions the 
function of the Ministry of Energy and Water 
(MEW) in Article 10 and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) in Article 11. In 
the November 2007 draft, these ministries were 
only mentioned in an annex. While there appears 
to be a clear distinction between the functions 
of MEW and MAIL, with MEW responsible mainly 
for basin management and MAIL mainly for canal 
management, there are some overlapping functions, 
such as the establishment of associations, main 
canal works or working within the irrigation system. 
For example, MEW has the function of establishing 
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achieved. Technical challenges could make this 
even more difficult.
Even though it seems that there is only consideration 
for fairness at the basin level, Article 12, paragraph 
2 section 3, speaks directly to the local level as 
well. However, it is not evident whether there is a 
link to intra- or inter-canal water rights. Paragraph 
2, section 3 states: Develop local programs for 
development, use, conservation and management 
of water resources with regard to water right 
allocation.
Special attention is given to water allocation 
between canals within a basin, in risk situations, in 
paragraph 2, section 5: Design short, mid and long 
term measures to minimize the impact of droughts, 
floods and other hazards.
Article 8, paragraph 7, on right-of-ways, might limit 
the design and implementation of measures, which 
can be interpreted as having a negative impact. 
In Article 13, on river basin councils, it is stated 
that MEW has the responsibility to establish councils 
and that the Ministry “can delegate authority to 
the councils...when appropriate.” However, it 
is not stated under which conditions this would 
be the case. Furthermore, even though it is 
stated that councils are “comprised of members 
representing water users, relevant national and 
local agencies and other stakeholders in the river 
basin” (Article 13, paragraph 1), it is left open how 
this will be operationalised in terms of seats and 
voting power102 and just assumes the possibility of 
a council representing the whole basin. Since the 
councils are introduced in a top-down manner, real 
representation is unlikely. Again, keeping in mind 
Article 8, paragraph 7 on the right-of-way, it seems 
that they might not be representing the whole 
basin, and this puts their legitimacy to operate as a 
river basin councils or sub-basin councils even more 
into question. 
In Article 14, paragraph 1, the functions of the river 
basin councils are outlined: 
102 For additional discussion, see the section on KRBP below.
Accepting that irrigation schemes reveres only to 
formal systems, the underlying assumption appears 
to be that “fair allocation of water rights” would 
not be considered in traditional community-
managed irrigation systems, and that fairness in 
the formal systems is based on norms of irrigation 
(Article 8, paragraph 4), for example crop water 
requirements. 
Article 12 determines that river basin agencies shall 
be established but does not state which ministry 
is responsible for this task and which ministries 
should be represented within the basin agencies, 
or whether this is just a restructuring of MEW 
(which is responsible for basin management) from 
administrative to hydrological boundaries. Article 
10, paragraphs 10 and 11, state the following on 
the functions of MEW: 
Establishing bodies for river basins study • 
teams and evaluating their activities
Facilitating technical and financial assistance • 
and capacity building programmes for river 
basins in cooperation with MAIL, the Ministry 
of Urban Development, MRRD [Ministry of 
Rural Reconstruction and Development] and 
NEPA [National Environmental Protection 
Agency]
Article 12, paragraph 2 outlines the function of the 
river basin agencies. They are supposed to develop 
plans and manage water resources, consult with 
river basin councils and implement the decision of 
the councils. 
Article 12, paragraph 1 makes explicit reference 
to fairness. It states, “River basin agencies shall 
be established to facilitate...fair distribution of 
water rights.” Since the emphasis is on the basin, 
it appears that the article refers to fairness of 
water allocation only between main canals and 
not within irrigation systems. Establishing fairness 
between canals within a basin without addressing 
fairness within individual canals could aggravate 
the situation for tail-enders. Given what Article 
8, paragraph 7 says about right-of-ways, it is not 
evident that fairness within a whole basin can be 
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infrastructure but does not specify who will be 
responsible. It states, “Water abstraction from 
a source and waste water discharge to a stream 
need to be measured with a reliable and approved 
measuring device by the relevant agencies.” 
It seems that the term waste water is not included 
in the definitions in Article 3, hence it is not evident 
whether it incorporates drainage water, for which 
a permit is needed (Article 21, paragraphs 2-3). 
Furthermore, as will be argued below, irrigation 
systems can be interlinked in a mesh system, so to 
metre at the main intake and at the main drainage 
canal might not be sufficient to determine the 
amount used within an irrigation canal. 
Finally, it appears that the river basin councils only 
deal with permits and not with licenses. It is not 
evident who is responsible under the Draft Water 
Law for issuing and regulating licenses.
Although the councils derive their authority from 
MEW, the Draft Water Law does not state that MEW 
can issue permits. This situation could imply that, 
as long as the councils are not set up, permits will 
not be issued. 
Article 17 states that MEW may establish sub-basin 
councils, and Article 14, paragraph 2 states that 
basin councils can delegate part of their function 
and power to sub-basin councils. However, it 
appears that neither basin councils nor sub-basin 
councils influence who is represented on the higher- 
or lower-level councils. 
Article 9 determines that a Supreme Council of 
Water Affairs’ Management will be established. 
Unlike in the draft of November 2007, which 
clearly outlined this body’s responsibilities both 
for coordination and for representing Afghanistan’s 
interests on transboundary rivers, the June 
2008 draft only states that its functions will be 
determined by a separate regulation.
The most local level organisations are the water 
user associations and irrigation associations. The 
June 2008 Draft Water Law uses different terms 
for associations, but only one term is mentioned 
in the definition section: water user associations. 
Prepare water resources management strategy 1. 
for its basin in accordance with the national 
water policy upon considering the conditions 
and needs of the basin.
Regulate and supervise the exercise of rights 2. 
and use of water.
Setting of required conditions to evaluate, 3. 
modify and cancellation of permits and 
refusal of applications in the relevant basin.
Issuance, record, change or cancel the 4. 
permits and ensure proper compliance with 
the condition of permit.
Solve disputes related to water distribution 5. 
and use in its basin.
Make decisions on imposing and collecting of 6. 
fines in accordance with the law. 
The previous (November 2007) Draft Water Law also 
stated “charge a fee for services rendered.”103 The 
current draft’s Article 7, discussed above, could 
imply that river basin councils or agencies could 
charge for their services. 
Given that the river basin agency is supposed to 
implement the decisions of the councils and that 
councils have administrative as well as decision-
making functions, it would seems more appropriate 
that the function set out in Article 14, paragraphs 
1-3, would be given to the agency. The underlying 
assumption is that the council has authority to make 
decisions; in this respect, Article 13, paragraph 1 on 
representation is crucial. It is also essential to have 
the right infrastructure in place in order to be able 
to measure abstraction and drainage, determine 
usage within an irrigation system, forecast water 
availability and adjust permits accordingly. This 
includes sufficient gauging stations within the basin 
and the control infrastructure to allocate the water 
amounts set out in the permits. So far this is not 
the case. 
Article 22 specifically  mentions  control 
103 Article 14, Paragraph 1 (11)
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that the ministry would be MAIL. If that were 
the case, then Article 11, paragraph 2 would be 
a direct contradiction, since it states that MAIL’s 
responsibility is, “Managing irrigation schemes 
together with users and maintaining fair allocation 
of water rights the system.”
Article 23, paragraph 2 makes reference to a mirab 
bashi and mirab. “Irrigation Association may confer 
the responsibility for allocation and distribution 
of water within the irrigation network to Mirab 
Bashi and/or Mirab, appointed by the irrigation 
association.” 
As MAIL appears to be responsible for establishing 
irrigation associations in formal irrigation systems, 
the introduction of the traditional terms for water 
manager in these formal systems is an appearance 
of a link with traditions and customs. 
Water rights, permits and licenses
Article 3 of the Draft Water Law explains the 
terminology of the water law. The translation of the 
June 2008 draft did not include these definitions. 
However, it was possible to note that, while the 
November 2007 version distinguished between 
permit and usage permit, the June 2008 version 
uses the terms licence and permit and has dropped 
the term usage permit. Taking into consideration 
the other articles of the law (for example Articles 
15 and 20), one can deduce that the term permit in 
the 2008 draft might have the same meaning as the 
term usage permit in the November 2007 draft and 
that the 2008 term license might have replaced the 
2007 term permit. The November 2007 version gave 
the following definitions:
Permit • [apparently corresponding with 2008 
license]: an official document to be issued to 
allow undertaking of an activity related to 
reserve of water in accordance with this law. 
Usage permit • [apparently corresponding with 
2008 permit]: an official document to be 
issued for using of water resources according 
to the provision of this law.
It is not evident whether the definitions have 
Unfortunately the definition is not given. In 
the November 2007 draft the term defined 
was associations of water users. Article 3 says 
“Associations of water users: is the volunteer group 
of real and legal persons to meet common social, 
economic and professional objectives with regard 
to the use of water.” It is not evident, whether in 
the June 2008 Draft Water Law only the term or 
also the definition will have changed. 
A problem with the definition “association of water 
users” is that it assumes common objectives. 
However, water in irrigation canals is used by 
different interest groups, such as herders for 
cattle watering and households for drinking water, 
sanitation and washing as well as mill owners or 
micro-hydropower plant owners for producing 
electricity. Hence, with this definition it is possible 
to separate these different interest groups, which 
might lead to the problem that the “association of 
water users” has no control over these different 
interest groups and only focuses on one specific 
target, water for irrigation. In addition to this, 
irrigation canals are also used by cities and towns, 
and it is not evident how these are integrated into 
“association of water users” on the one hand and 
river basin councils on the other. (A similar issue 
appears in the WSS drafts.)
Article 18, paragraph 2 states, “Terms of function, 
responsibilities, power and others relevant issues 
of these associations shall be regulated in the 
charter/regulation.”
In principal, this could imply that each association 
could have its own charter with relevant bylaws 
regarding membership and organizational structure. 
Both MEW and MAIL are assigned to register, 
recognize, support and cooperate on capacity 
building for these two forms of associations. 
Article 23, on water use in agriculture, makes 
reference to “irrigation water association” as well 
as irrigation associations, and the term water user 
associations is not used. Article 23 paragraph 1 
refers to a ministry that shall confer responsibility 
for allocation and distribution; however, it is 
not evident which ministry is referred to. From 
the term irrigation association one could deduce 
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To use water from natural springs with 5. 
minerals or hot water for commercial 
purposes
To drill a borehole or construct a deep or 6. 
shallow well for commercial, industrial, 
agricultural and urban water supply 
purposes
To construct dams and any other structures 7. 
for impoundment of water, exceeding a 
volume of 10,000 cubic metres
To construct any infrastructure which 8. 
interferes with the banks, bed, course or 
protected right-of-way area of public streams, 
marshes, Karezes and springs
Purchase and sale of license and permits written in 
this law are prohibited.  
Article 15 explains the conditions when permits 
can be cancelled or revised. The river basin council 
may revise or cancel the permits if and when:
The water user, without having justified 1. 
reasons, could not use his or her allocated 
amount of water or water usage amount 
exceed more than allocated.
There is insufficient water available for 2. 
different sectors.
Another usage of greater national benefit 3. 
emerged.
Article 26 makes reference to licenses for WUAs 
and irrigation associations. It appears that only 
licenses are given to these two associations in case 
the government transfers a water resources project 
(nevertheless it is not clear what the term project 
entails). The article states:
The government may transfer the water • 
resources projects to water user associations 
or irrigation associations under clear terms 
and conditions of which licenses is part of.
changed in the 2008 draft. 
The term water right is not described in Article 
3, even though later articles use the term. For 
example, Article 20 discusses changing traditional 
rights into permits, and Article 28 discusses water 
right suspension. 
Article 19, on water use, states that no permits are 
needed for water for drinking and basic domestic 
use (not to exceed 5 cubic meters per family per 
day), use of a boat for transport and use of water 
for fire extinguishing and that “the existing water 
rights subject to compliance with Article 21 (1) of 
this law.”
Article 20 on permits states that, “Existing water 
rights of traditional systems, based on river basin 
management policy, will be gradually changed into 
permits. The water user associations in the existing 
systems, after registration, are considered to be 
eligible for permits.”
The term license is not used here. This could imply 
that nonpermanent structures do not require 
licenses, or documents on the infrastructure. In 
addition, it appears that only new irrigation systems 
might require a license as outlined in Article 21. 
Article 21, paragraphs 1-3 says licenses or permit 
are issued based on the application of water 
users, including governmental water projects, in 
accordance with this law.
It is mandatory to submit an application to obtain 
a license or permit in the following instances:
To abstract surface or ground water in newly 1. 
established development projects
To discharge waste water into public water 2. 
resources
To discharge drainage water into water 3. 
resources
To use water resources for commercial and 4. 
industrial purposes
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or irrigation association or even both.104 Article 20 
stated, “existing water rights...will be gradually 
changed into permits,” while Article 21 indicates 
that an individual or association would require at 
least two permits, for water allocation as well as 
for drainage. In addition, a license will be needed 
in case of transfer of a water resources project.
Finally, Article 21 distinguishes between drainage 
and waste water, but these two terms are not 
defined in Article 3. Even though Article 21 
makes reference to flow, and therefore suggests 
measuring of drainage and waste water, Article 22 
makes reference only to waste water and gauging 
facilities. 
The responsibility for drainage water and its 
infrastructure is not determined within the Draft 
Water Law. Article 11 lists managing irrigation 
schemes and protecting irrigation canals as 
functions of MAIL. However, the focus appears to 
be on water allocation, not drainage water or even 
drainage infrastructure. Therefore, it is not evident 
who would be responsible for drainage water, and 
who would measure drainage flow. 
Article 25, on the utilisation of water for generation 
of hydroelectricity says, “Installation of microhydles 
[micro-hydropower plants] in the irrigation systems 
shall be subject to the collective agreement of 
MAIL, MRRD and irrigation associations.” Neither 
WUAs nor MEW not basin councils are involved 
in the agreement. Furthermore, it appears that 
micro-hydropower plants do not need a license for 
construction or a permit for water utilisation. The 
article only states that “water usage for generating 
energy (macro and micro scales) shall be managed 
in accordance with this law in a manner not to 
affect drinking and domestic water, agriculture and 
the irrigation infrastructures, river banks, roads 
and other structures.” Making it obligatory for 
micro-hydropower plants owners to have a permit 
and license would decrease the transaction costs 
for canal communities of reaching an agreement 
on construction and operation. Even though micro-
104 Walter Osenberg reviewing this report commented, “Normally 
it will be the canal or WUA. However, where these do not exist or 
small canals take off from the river, individual permits might also be 
issued.”
Water user associations and irrigation • 
associations covered have the ownership 
of the projects identified in sub-article (1) 
and shall be responsible for operation and 
maintenance of these projects. 
This would support the point made above, that 
nonpermanent structures do not receive licenses. 
Article 28 is on the suspension of water rights, and 
states the following. Water right shall be suspended 
in the following cases:
If a water user fails to pay the fee of a water 1. 
service provider
If a water user violates any provision of this 2. 
law
If a water user misuses services3. 
As discussed above, the law does not define the 
term water right. Furthermore, it is not evident 
who is responsible for the suspension of a water 
right; for example, river basin councils are only 
responsible for permits (not licenses). Since, it 
refers to payment, it appears that Article 28 is 
related to users in irrigation systems only. Article 18, 
on WUAs, emphasizes the charter and regulation of 
the association, and therefore suspensions should 
be part of that charter and regulation and not part 
of the water law. As it stands, it appears either that 
Article 28 contradicts Article 20, which states that 
water rights should be changed to permits, or that 
Article 28 could be applicable before a permit is 
issued. However, it is not clear why and to whom 
irrigation communities should pay a fee and what 
kind of service they should receive for it. 
Article 20 stated that “water user associations in the 
existing systems...are considered to be eligible for 
permits,” but Articles 15 and 21 refer to individual 
water users and not to associations of water users. 
Hence, it is not obvious whether the recipient of 
a permit will be an individual water user, a WUA 
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hydropower plants are explicitly mentioned, rice 
or wheat mills, which could have the same effect 
as micro-hydropower plants, are not mentioned. 
Hence, it seems that no agreement is necessary to 
construct or operate rice or wheat mills.  
Transboundary issues
This subsection is based on the Draft Water Law of 
November 2007, since the definitions in the Draft 
Water Law of June 2008 are omitted.
Article 3 includes the following definitions of 
terminology relevant for transboundary river 
basins. 
River basin: catchments water into which • 
water naturally flows in one outlet (point).
Sub-river basin: a branch of river basin. • 
Transboundary river: a river which flows • 
on the common border of Afghanistan and 
another neighbouring country. 
River basin approach: the overall management • 
of water resources and establishment of 
managing offices with regards to natural 
borders of river basins in the country.
The definition of transboundary river appears to 
be a definition for a border river. According to this 
definition, only the Amu Darya and the Pjanj are 
transboundary rivers, and other rivers crossing 
international boundaries would be excluded. In 
any case, the definition given for the river basin 
approach justifies Afghanistan’s national focus in 
developing its water resources.
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and on-farm water distribution.107 
In his later studies,108 which involved a variety of 
irrigation systems in different provinces, utilising 
diverse water sources, he finds differences in 
social water management and revises his earlier 
perception of uniformity in the mirab system: 
Initial field visits indicate that the mirab 
does not exist as a nationwide phenomenon. 
Even where there are water masters, there 
are considerable regional variations in the 
structure (although the role is more or less 
standard throughout the country).109 
Lee appears to distance himself from the three-
tier system. He starts to distinguish between wakil, 
mirab, and chak bashi, which he found on the 
Hazhdah Nahr canals on the lower Balkh and the 
Hari Rod. “In the Balkh and Kunduz river system, 
the canal master is referred to as a mirab bashi. In 
the Qala-i-Zal district of Kunduz, the mirab bashi’s 
assistants are termed kok bashi, on the lower Balkh 
River, as mirabs.”110 He notes that the “hierarchical 
structure of water masters can vary from sub-basin 
to sub-basin”111 and that even the role of supervision 
according to primary, secondary, and tertiary canal 
differs. He links the existence of the mirab system 
to water scarcity or an intercommunal water 
dispute.112  
Not only scarcity but also the size of the irrigation 
system influences whether a three-tier system is 
necessary. For Afghan Mazar in Kunduz, Lee states, 
“probably due to the fact that the communities at 
the head of the canal have fewer water problems, 
107 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 1.
108 Lee, “Social Water Management”; Lee, “Performance of 
Community Water Management Systems.”
109 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 46.
110 Lee, “Social Water Management” 46.
111 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 46.
112 Lee, “Social Water Management.”
Local Realities5. 
What is known about the mirab  5.1 
 system?
Lee, analysing social water management on the 
Balkh Ab River,105  makes the statement that “most 
irrigation systems in Afghanistan” are supervised 
in a three-tier level of community-based water 
bailiffs. According to him, primary canals have a 
water bailiff, secondary canals are supervised by 
a mirab, and tertiary ditches are controlled by a 
chakbahi. Lee comes to the conclusion that, even 
though the mirab system “at least as far as the name 
is concerned, is a very ancient one ... today the 
power of the mirabs is but a shadow of what it once 
was even thirty years ago.”106 He bases his analysis 
on the culture of guns, resettlements of different 
ethnic groups within the basin, new developments 
such as mills and industries as well as the lack of 
enforcement of earlier water laws. Even though he 
generalises, based on findings on one river, Lee’s 
study shows nicely the changes that have taken 
place in one basin, and thus the difficulties that 
current donor and government policies on river 
basin management may face. 
Given the negative statement in that 2003 study, 
it appears encouraging that Lee is very positive 
about the role of the mirab in 2006 after having 
conducted further research. He states that: 
although the breakdown of social cohesion over 
the last three decades, along with the exodus 
of many communities as internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) or refugees in camps in Pakistan 
and Iran and some government interventions, 
have placed the system under severe stress, the 
‘water masters’ system has survived and has 
often been the sole means of managing in-canal 
105 J.L. Lee, 2003. Water Resource Management on the Balkh Ab 
River and Hazhdah Nahr Canal Network: From Crisis to Collapse, 
(Kabul: UNAMA/CAFE), p. 4.
106 Lee, “Water Resource Management on the Balkh Ab River,” 4.
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post because he was “the most suitable member of 
the family.”120 The nephew had previously assisted 
the former mirab. Anderson121 states, “Anyone from 
the same extended family can take over the mirab 
role, provided that the community agrees. In this 
way, the mirab’s knowledge is passed down through 
the generations.” Similarly, Shobair,122 who does not 
distinguish between wakil, mirab bashi and mirab, 
states that the candidate should “preferably...be 
from a mirab family or son of an old mirab.” The 
existing literature does not mention whether the 
same system applies to lower-level water managers 
(mirab, chak bashi, or kok bashi). Having fully 
described the heritage of the position, Shobair 
says that the first prerequisite for a mirab is to be 
honest. Other authors show that mirabs who did not 
fulfil the function adequately were not re-elected 
or were fired. For example, Lee states that “in a 
number of instances in the primary research sites, 
corrupt, inefficient or lazy water masters were 
reported to have been replaced.”123  
It is not entirely clear how landowners from different 
communities along one large irrigation canal agree 
on one wakil or mirab bashi. As Lee124 describes it, 
“As there are a large number of landowners on the 
canal, the individual communities have pre-election 
meetings in their communities and nominate 
two individuals to represent them at the general 
meeting.” Quoting a former mirab, ter Steege125 
explains, “The mirab [bashi] had to be elected from 
downstream,” because that would ensure “water 
delivery until the tail of the canal, which would 
than result in equal water distribution.” However, 
ter Steege states that this system was in place 
thirty years ago, and at the time of his research, the 
mirab bashi was from upstream and the mirab from 
downstream. Similarly, Pain126 states, “The method 
120 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 46-7.
121 Anderson, “Irrigation Systems,” 13.
122 S.S. Shobair, “Mirab and Mirab System in Afghanistan,” power 
point presentation. (Kabul: FAO/EIRP, 2005), slide 8.
123 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 48.
124 Lee, “Performance of Community Water Management Systems,” 36.
125 ter Steege, “Infrastructure and Water Distribution,” 9.
126 A. Pain, “Understanding Village Institutions: Case Studies 
on Water Management from Fayrab and Saripul” (Kabul: Afghan 
Research and Evaluation Unit, 2004, http://www.areu.org.af/index.
php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=339), 14.
upstream kok bashi are not seen as a priority.”113 
In addition, he states, “on shorter canals...the 
management structure is flat and consists of one 
or two mirabs with no overseer (wakil or mirab 
bashi).”114 Lee’s statement questions whether the 
western perception that local water management is 
based on hydraulic boundaries is always applicable 
for Afghanistan. Having two equal mirabs on one 
canal suggests that management is not always based 
on hydraulic boundaries.115 Similarly, Lee explains, 
“On the peri-urban canals of Herat city, such as the 
Joy-i-Naw, Joy-i-Injil and Joy-i-Guzara, the canal is 
divided into a three-block (blok) system.”116 
Sometimes the function of the mirab is combined 
with other roles. “In a number of the communities,” 
Lee says, referring to Ghazni Province and some 
communities in the rangelands of Herat Province, 
“a senior community elder or the arbab [the 
community elder, usually the head of the shora, the 
community of elders], combined his role as a shora 
member with the work of a mirab.”117 Lee links 
the existence of a formal mirab system with the 
cultural and ethnic background of the community 
in question.118 This would suggest that there is only 
one ethnicity present at each canal; this, however, 
is highly unlikely.
Whom do mirabs represent? 5.2 
By tradition, the position of the mirab was 
apparently handed down within the family. 
Lee says that this is often no longer the case, 
“Unfortunately, today a good proportion of the 
water bailiffs are relative newcomers to the 
position and consequently lack the institutional 
memory and experience.”119 Nevertheless, he also 
describes a case in which the subcatchment jirga 
appointed the nephew of the former mirab to the 
113 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 31.
114 Lee, “Social Water Management.”
115 Since the mirab is not responsible for karez and surface irrigation 
systems at the same time, mirab systems are not based on hydrological 
boundaries.
116 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 46.
117 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 46.
118 Lee, “Social Water Management.”
119 Lee, “Water Resource Management on the Balkh Ab River,” 5.
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of the elite, so it is unclear how voting power in a 
village is distributed within the elite: whether each 
landowner has the same voting right or whether 
voting rights are determined by the amount of 
land owned or the individual water right of the 
landowner. He does affirm that there is a difference 
in voting power, “At least a proportion of the water 
masters in the primary research sites hold their 
post by virtue of their political position or wealth, 
and they are able to maintain their position 
despite the complaints of the small farmers and 
sharecroppers.”134 Given the culture of guns also 
highlighted by Lee,135 it is questionable whether 
mirabs can address all complaints.
Lee did not do an in-depth study, but rather focused 
on different systems in a relatively short time, and 
so it is remarkable that he can present such deep 
insights. It is also obvious, however, that more 
research is needed to fully understand the system. 
Lee does not directly connect the issue of 
representation to that of payment for the mirab’s 
services.136 Nevertheless, the wages of the mirab 
are directly related to the land under irrigation. 
This underlines the function of the mirab for 
the landowning community. Larger landowners 
pay more to the mirab than small landholders or 
sharecroppers. The data presented above show 
that, although the size of the landholding may 
not be related to voting power to elect the mirab, 
it does appear to be related to payment for the 
mirab’s services. An explanation for this may lie in 
the level of payment. Lee137 states, “The payments 
water masters receive for their work are slight in 
comparison to both the on-farm yields and the work 
undertaken...In effect, the post of mirab in most 
communities is a semi-voluntary position.” Lee then 
takes a different track and questions, maybe due to 
the strategy to create WUAs—an initiative that might 
influence the level of payments to the mirabs—
whether the low level of remuneration affects the 
sustainability of the mirab system or increases the 
134 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 47.
135 Lee, “Water Resource Management on the Balkh Ab River.”
136 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 46-8.
137 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 48.
of selecting the mirab [from tail-end villages] 
indicates an element of equity has been built into 
the system.” Even though Shobair says the mirab 
should be from the tail-end, he also states that the 
mirab has to be “acceptable by all water users in 
upstream, midstream and downstream.”127  
The system of inheriting the mirab position appears 
to have changed. Lee distinguishes between 
two different mirabs, one who is chosen by the 
community and one who is appointed directly by 
“commanders and landlords.”128 Shobair does not 
make this distinction; according to him, an elite 
group only selects the mirab: “the landlords, 
key farmers, elders, and warlords.”129 In a later 
publication, Lee states that mirabs: 
“are appointed solely by landowners or their 
nominees on the canal in question” and later 
“the position of water master, whether it 
be wakil, mirab, chak bashi or kok bashi, is 
determined by the ‘vote’ of a vested interest 
group, namely landowners with irrigated land 
and water rights to the canal in question.”130 
Lee offers an explanation for why the mirabs 
are selected by an elite of landowners and not 
by all inhabitants along the canal, “Their role is 
not to provide food or work for the landless, the 
dispossessed, the internally displaced or other 
‘vulnerables.’ They are there to serve the needs 
of the landowning elite.”131 As an exception to this 
general rule, Lee describes the Shinwari clans in the 
Paikha river valley, where “all adult males appear 
to have a voice in the election of the mirab,”132 
and another case where sharecroppers have a say 
as well.133  
Lee does not distinguish among different members 
127 Shobair, “Mirab and Mirab System,” slide 8.
128 Lee, “Water Resource Management on the Balkh Ab River,” 5 and 
17.
129 Shobair, “Mirab and Mirab System.”
130 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 3 and 47.
131 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 47.
132 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 47.
133 Lee, “Performance of Community Water Management Systems,” 
30, footnote 37.
AREU Issues Paper Series
30
reported to have a mirab, it was found that only in 
those lower villages below Qala-i-Naw, where water 
is a constraint, were mirabs appointed. In the upper 
villages, including in the primary research sites, 
water issues and operation and maintenance are 
decided by a forum of elders within each village.”144 
Furthermore, it may be that the mirab is not 
employed for water distribution, but only for 
controlling the intake. Lee states that, in Shamsha 
Pur distinct in Nangarhar Province, there are 
mirabs at each of the primary canals drawing water 
from the Surkh Rod River. However, their primary 
function is not water allocation, but “to operate 
and maintain the control gates which release water 
into the primary canals. In addition, the mirab is 
required to alert the canal communities in case of 
any breach of the canal dykes and banks.”145  This is 
similar for the Atishan canal in Herat, where “water 
management is undertaken by the shora and not by 
a mirab, though issues related to the intake of the 
wide canal are referred to the wakil.”146   
In situations where the mirab is responsible for 
water distribution along the main canal, Lee argues 
that one of the mirab’s functions is “to reconcile 
disputes between canal irrigators over water sharing 
issues.”147  However, this may not necessarily always 
be the case. Pain states that: 
“when pressed on this issue [conflicts 
concerning water distribution within a 
village], there might be some admission that 
if there was a problem the shora would step 
in and advise the person [who took additional 
water] that this was not acceptable behaviour 
and it should be stopped and, if necessary, 
order irrigation time to be repaid if it had 
been wrongly taken.”148  
Lee mentions both institutions: “Individual 
landowners do not hesitate to complain to their 
community shora or the water master if they 
144 Anderson, “Irrigation Systems,” 17.
145 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 17.
146 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 39.
147 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 3.
148 Pain, “Understanding Village Iinstitutions,” 12.
likelihood of bribes.138  Nevertheless, he also points 
out that the position of mirab enhances the social 
status of the person who fills it. 
The role of the mirab5.3 
The role of the mirab appears to differ in different 
communities. Anderson states, for two research 
sites (Otarkhel and Khawaji) in Nangarhar Province, 
that the mirab is only used “for the summer crop 
when water shortages occur and disputes are 
more likely.”139  It thus seems that the position of 
the mirab is seasonal and related to the level of 
water scarcity. Discussing Maruf China in Nangarhar 
Province, Lee states, “the mirab is only engaged 
during spring when there is sufficient water in the 
wash to provide irrigation for the community.” 
140Anderson puts it differently, stating for the same 
community that “they have a mirab, but he is 
only used in spring as there is virtually no water in 
summer.”141 Similarly, if there is sufficient water, 
there may not be a need to elect a mirab. Lee refers 
to the appointment of the mirab in Herat (Khalifa 
Rahmat-i-Ulya canal), “The canal communities tend 
to only elect a mirab for the canal where there is a 
problem with water shortages in the canal...In 2005 
the snow and rains were good so the communities 
saw no need to appoint a mirab.”142   
When water scarcity is not a significant problem, 
it may also be that a different person takes up 
the role of mirab. Lee states, for Turmai in Ghazni 
Province, that “the communities do not employ 
formal mirabs; instead water distribution in canals 
is supervised by the head of each community’s 
traditional shora. The reason for not employing 
a mirab is said to be due to the fact that these 
communities do not suffer from water shortages, 
unlike those at the tail of the river system (who 
do have mirabs).”143 Similarly, Anderson observes 
of Ghazni Province that “although each canal was 
138 Lee, “Social Water Management.”
139 Anderson, “Irrigation systems,” 13.
140 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 15.
141 Anderson, “Irrigation Systems,” 13.
142 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 44.
143 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 22. See also section 6.3, 
“Water sharing between canals.”
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In this sense, Lee gives the image of equity in 
terms of maintenance work, an assessment shared 
by Anderson, “Labour is provided by the irrigators 
depending on landholding, according to a local 
system that converts to one person per day for 30 
jerib, one person every two days for 20 jerib and 
one person every three days for 10 jerib.”152 Lee 
gives the impression of unity and collective work 
within the system: “Cleaning is done in a gang from 
the head to the tail of the system.”153 However, 
Anderson points out that there are problems relating 
to the hashar labour system. Since canals supply 
more than one village, he says, “communities tend 
to give more attention to their own canal, thereby 
neglecting agreed maintenance commitments 
for the shared canal,” adding that there is “poor 
cooperation among villages.”154  
Whereas Lee and Anderson reason that the 
maintenance contribution is related to landholding 
or water rights, ter Steege sees technology as a factor 
influencing labour contributions. He observes for 
the Asqalan canal in Kunduz that “when we walked 
through their fields, we saw water being pumped 
with diesel pumps in some canals. The people of 
Baluch do not contribute in labour or kind to the 
canal; their lands are simply too high for gravity 
irrigation.”155 This would imply that, depending 
on the technology used, size of landholding and 
even canal water use is not necessarily linked with 
maintenance work. However, ter Steege does not 
say whether the Baluch community contributes to 
maintenance work at the intake level. 
Another issue that has not been addressed in 
the literature is whether nonconsumptive users, 
such as mill owners or users of micro-hydropower 
plants, have to contribute to maintenance work. 
If the obligation to contribute to maintenance 
work only applies to agricultural landholders and 
other consumptive water users, this would seem 
to be unlikely. However, if a water rights system 
applies, then nonconsumptive users may have to 
contribute. 
152 Anderson, “Irrigation Systems,” 26.
153 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 44.
154 Anderson, “Irrigation Systems,” 22 and 27.
155 ter Steege, “Infrastructure and Water Distribution,” 9.
believe a neighbour is taking more water than he 
is entitled to.”149 He explains that the arbab, as 
the highest authority in the community, may make 
the final decision on the conflict, but that disputing 
individuals may also look for higher-level support 
outside the community at the district or province 
level.
It appears that the mirab is responsible for water 
allocation and the organisation of maintenance 
work, and that water sharing disputes between 
farmers are solved by the mirab and the shora. 
It seems that of the two, the shora has more 
authority to solve serious conflicts and facilitate 
compensation negotiations. 
Sharing maintenance work5.4 
Lee studied maintenance issues in the so-called 
hashar labour system, which appears to vary in 
different canal systems. For Nangarhar, he sees a 
direct link between maintenance and water rights: 
Each village served by the canals nominates 
a single elder who is knowledgeable about 
water rights to represent them to the mirab, 
to ensure that labour is apportioned fairly 
and that each community is not cheated out 
of any allocation as a result of changes in the 
canal bed, banks and intakes.150 
On the other hand, for Herat he describes a system 
in which the input of labour is based on the amount 
of irrigated land (calculated in jerib), giving the 
following example: 
In-canal cleaning is also proportional to 
the amount of land owned and irrigated: a 
landowner who has 10 jerib of land will be 
assigned a longer length of the canal to clean 
than an individual who only owns 1 jerib, on 
the basis that the individual with 10 jerib 
will be required to provide more labourers 
than the individual with 1 jerib.151 
149 Lee, “Performance of Community Water Management Systems,” 
15.
150 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 15.
151 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 44.
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chain, however, little or no water was delivered 
through the system.”160 He highlights the inequality 
of water distribution between villages along main 
canals in different provinces, and reports on a canal 
in Nangarhar:
Ten communities in total use the water of 
the Qara Bagh canal: six at the head and four 
at the tail. [Only] the tail end communities 
operate a variable summer and winter 
rotation in canal, known as the greater, or 
large, rotation (nowbat-i-kalan) and the 
lesser, or small, rotation (nowbat-i-khurd).161 
For different canals in Ghazni, he states that there 
are differences in water allocation between head-
end and tail-end villages, “Sometimes communities 
at the tail of canals may appeal to upstreamers 
for additional water on the basis of sawab, an act 
of meritorious charity.”162 Similarly, he reports on 
Kunduz, “There are 78 mardi kar along the length 
of the Char Gul canal, making an approximately 
command area of 2,340 jerib (468 ha). However, 
there is some suggestion that the mardi kar-to-area 
ratio varies along the canal length.”163 For the Aq 
Tepa canal in Kunduz, he is more specific, “In the 
middle section of the Aq Tepa canal, one mardi kar 
is equivalent to 16 jerib and 4 hours of water; at 
the head of the canal one mardi kar is equivalent to 
32 jerib and 8 hours of water.”164 Finally, he shows 
inequality between head- and tail-enders in Herat: 
water is allocated according to the juftgaw...
The total juftgaw-age of the Atishan canal is 
120. A juftgaw on the Atishan canal appears 
to be a standard area of 120 jerib, though 
during interviews with Gawashk community 
one respondent stated that a juftgaw at the 
head of the canal was a smaller area.165 
Similarly, Anderson highlights differences between 
head-end and tail-end water allocation along one 
160 Lee, “Water Resource Management on the Balkh Ab River,” 13.
161 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 17.
162 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 23.
163 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 31.
164 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 33.
165 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 35.
Water conflicts within and   5.5 
 between villages
Anderson reports equitable water sharing and, 
during scarcity, even proportional equity based 
on basic needs and social protection: “At times 
of shortage water is reduced, but the share time 
is kept the same. Water may be reduced for only 
those plots that have a large water share so that 
the poorer sections of the community can at least 
achieve a minimum amount of irrigation.”156  
Pain, looking at water distribution within villages 
and between villages in two districts in different 
provinces in northern Afghanistan (Sayyad District 
in Sar-i-Pul Province and Dawalatabad District in 
Faryab Province), argues that within villages there 
is equity of water distribution.157 He shows that 
within three villages in the Dawalatabad District, 
equity is even enforced between sub-canals.158 
Nevertheless, he states that this does not take into 
account water losses within the canal, and that 
therefore equity of timing between sub-canals does 
not imply equity of sub-canal water amount. 
The situation between villages along the main canal 
may be equitable as well. According to Pain, there 
are old water-sharing agreements between villages 
along main canals. Inter-village agreements were 
enforced by higher-level mirabs, who were elected 
from the tail-end villages. Therefore, Pain reasons 
that the sharing and observation of the rules had a 
built-in system of equity between villages “since 
downstream representatives would have a vested 
interest in ensuring fair water distribution.”159  
On the other hand, Lee points out that water 
distribution along a main canal is inequitable. 
He states that “despite the drought, upstream 
communities were mostly unaffected, and still 
had sufficient water to continue their practice of 
two crops a year...At the bottom end of the water 
156 Anderson, “Irrigation Systems,” 11.
157 Pain, “Understanding Village Institutions.”
158 Pain, “Understanding Village Institutions,” compare tables 2, 3 
and 4.
159 Pain, “Understanding Village Institutions,” 14.
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mid 1970s.”168 This point highlights the fact that 
inequities between head-end and tail-end were 
taken into account and maybe equalled out through 
government intervention.
Pain reports that, during the rule of the Taliban, 
the local system again received support from 
higher administrative levels. He gives the example 
of Sayyad District in Sar-i-Pul Province:
It was the view of the shora head that during 
the time of the Taliban the water distribution 
system worked well and there were strict 
sanctions on those who broke the rules. He 
cited the example of one offender who had 
been caught and paraded by the Taliban in 
Sayyad Village Three.169 
Whether the linkages and support structures between 
mirabs and district governors are functional today 
is questionable and may depend on the district’s 
authority. Lee states for the Balkh river: 
Government appears unwilling, or incapable, 
of supporting the mirab bashis, or enforcing 
the law of water rights. Nor is it willing to 
risk confrontation with powerful warlords, 
commanders and landlords, many of whom 
support one or other of the current government 
factions either militarily or financially.170 
Nevertheless, it appears that mirabs or shoras 
consult or voice their complaints to government 
departments. Pain and Anderson give examples of 
this consultation. Lee gives an example of how the 
influence changed over time and even involved the 
national level.171 
 
168 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 35.
169 Pain, “Understanding Village Institutions,” 17.
170 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 16.
171 Lee, “Social Water Management,” 37.
canal: 
For the upper half of the Jaghatu valley, water 
does not seem to be a constraint and this is 
reflected in the cropping patterns and fewer 
tree crops. Further down the valley, below 
Qala-i-Naw, surface water shortages do occur 
and this is reflected in the greater proportion 
of tree crops that are probably using the 
relatively high groundwater levels.166 
Based on the literature review, there appears to 
be a large difference between equity perceptions 
on sharing water. Whereas within communities an 
egalitarian principle (based on land rights) seems to 
apply, there appears to be a proportional principle 
between communities based on their position along 
the canal.
Outside influences5.6 
In an early publication, Lee argues that the 
mirab system was not independent of outside 
administrative units:167  
Mirab bashis were empowered by government 
to mobilise communities to supervise the 
repair and cleaning of all sections of their 
canals and take offs (sarband) from the 
Balkh Ab without having to obtain specific 
government permits...Government, prior 
to 1978, actively supported complaints by 
the mirab bashis against communities or 
individuals who illegally extracted more than 
their allocation of water. In many instances 
the provincial governors and law officers 
would imprison or fine such persons and 
communities.
Even more so, it appears that water rights were 
connected to taxation, “Taxation on land and 
water is determined according to the juftgaw-age 
of an individual landowner, however, there has 
been no collection of this water-land tax since the 
166 Anderson, “Irrigation Systems,” 16.
167 Lee, “Water Resource Management on the Balkh Ab River,” 5.
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work from mid-end to tail-end and are not concerned 
about the head-end. Head-end farmers pay less to 
the mirabs and sometimes do not want to contribute 
to their salary at all, because they work more for 
tail-end than head-end farmers.174  Similarly, in the 
Gow Mali canal in Takhar Province, it was stated that 
the head-end villages do not need the mirab and 
that only the mid- and tail-end villages select the 
mirab bashi. Residents along the two canals visited 
in Laghman Province (Nahr-i-Shaid and Pancha Joi) 
confirmed that mid- and tail-end villages select the 
mirab, who is then only responsible for that area. 
Head-enders do not contribute payments for the 
mirab.175  The situation appeared to be even worse 
in the Nahr-i-Khafa canal in Kapisa Province. Here it 
was stated that, even though the head-end villages 
come when the mirab is selected, they do not pay 
for the mirab, and the same applies even for mid-
end villages.176  However, in the case of the smaller 
canals (the 5 km Ghorian canal in Herat Province 
and the 6 km Arab Ha canal in Kunduz Province), it 
appeared that the mirab represented head-end and 
tail-end interests equally, and at least in the case 
of Arab Ha canal, head-end farmers contributed to 
his salary (Ghorian canal communities did not pay 
the mirab for his services).
The technology in use and the length of the canal may 
influence whether the mirab is mainly responsible 
for the tail-end areas and not for head-enders. In 
some of the canal systems visited, water allocation 
to the secondary canals is based on constructed or 
more natural water dividers, and therefore water is 
distributed proportionately. These kinds of systems 
were visited in Herat Province (Joy Now, Atishan 
and Enjil canals) and in Nangarhar Province (Tatang 
and Kamal canals). In these canals no statements 
were made about the mirab not representing head-
enders or about head-end villagers not paying the 
mirab.  
174 Informal interview, 10 September 2007.
175 Informal interviews, 30 September 2007 and 1 October 2007.
176 Informal interview, 12 September 2007.
Analysis of Fieldwork Data6. 
In the reviewed literature there are suggestions 
that the mirab system has aspects of inequity in 
respect of water sharing along the main canal, 
but that there is equity in terms of hashar work.172 
Nevertheless, it was strongly stated that the main 
mirab is supposed to come from the tail-end, 
because this guarantees equity between head- and 
tail-end users.173  
During fieldwork from September to October 2007, 
in most of the 16 canals visited, the impression was 
given that the head-enders do not need a mirab, do 
not pay for him or pay less than the then rate (five 
out of 16), receive more water (14 out of 16), and 
contribute less during hashar work (14 out of 16). 
The impression was given that the mirab is only 
responsible for the midstream and downstream 
parts of the main canal.
Based on this, one might interpret the proverb 
“Even though you may be the son of the mirab, it’s 
better to be one intake higher up” to mean that 
since the mirab is from the tail-end, and the system 
is inequitable and therefore the mirab is not able 
to bring enough water to the tail-end, it is better to 
live in an upstream canal that will have more water. 
In this sense, the proverb highlights two problems: 
inequity along a canal between head-end and tail-
end and inequity along a river between upstream 
and downstream.
Highlights of the fieldwork and issues of inequity 
found within the system are described below.
The mirab system in practice 6.1 
In Kabul Province in the Shaxardata canal system, 
which incorporates seven canals, the mirab bashi 
explained that two mirabs work at each canal. They 
172 Lee, “Social Water Management”; Anderson, “Irrigation 
Systems.”
173 Pain, “Understanding Village Institutions”; ter Steege, 
“Infrastructure and Water Distribution.”
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since the right off-take was closed; but this was not 
verified with the community, and it could be that 
somebody closed it to divert more water into the 
other canals. 
Whereas in Herat Province water dividers were 
constructed, in Nangarhar Province the division 
structures varied. Some were firmly fixed concrete 
structures, whereas others appeared to be more 
flexible and maybe therefore under constant 
negotiation. 
On the Tatang canal  (see Photo 3), the main 
representative of the canal admitted that the 
division of the water flow was more-or-less arbitrary 
since it was only estimated how much land lay on 
Water distribution6.2 
As indicated in the literature review, water 
distribution between head-end and tail-end villages 
is inequitable. The fieldwork further confirmed this. 
Whether proportional or nonproportional, often it 
is easiest to understand the differences in water 
supply to head-end and tail-end users by asking 
what the main crops are in the respective areas. 
Some examples are presented in Table 3. 
Nevertheless, it might be useful to distinguish 
between systems with structures for proportional 
distribution and systems without them.
The proportional system
As mentioned above, proportional systems were 
found in Herat and Nangarhar provinces. (This does 
not mean that these systems are proportional at 
all levels or that nonproportional systems are not 
also present in these provinces, as will be discussed 
below.) Although the system appears to be highly 
equitable because of proportional water dividers, 
these structures divide the water at a certain level 
in the canal. Hence, at this point there appears to 
be proportional equity (see Photo 1). Nevertheless, 
it is questionable whether the water division 
is permanent and therefore does not take into 
consideration changes in needs (either expansion 
or contraction) in the irrigated area.
As Photo 2 shows, there is some flexibility in the 
system, at least in terms of closing the division 
point. It seemed reasonable to assume that 
sufficient water was supplied to meet users’ needs, 
Examples of diversity of crops along main canalsTable 3. 
Province Canal Head-end Mid-end Tail-end
Baghlan Shakavodin Rice Cotton, less rice Cotton
Herat Enjil Rice Everything except rice
Wheat, 
melons,  
Orchards, 
gardens
Laghman Nahr-i-Shaid Rice
Maize, 
cotton, 
Orchards
Beans, 
cotton
Kapisa Nahr-i-Khafa Rice, Corn Rice, corn
Orchards, 
grapes
Enjil Canal, Herat ProvincePhoto 1. 
Enjil Canal, Herat ProvincePhoto 2. 
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at different locations and could therefore have a 
harvest every year, whereas a poorer farmer might 
have land only in one location and would have 
to depend on other income for two years out of 
three. 
Maybe more telling are the mirabs’ statements 
about the different proportionate systems in Herat 
and Nangarhar provinces. At the Enjil canal in Herat 
Province, the wakil stated that tail-end areas do 
not receive enough water. He explained that head-
enders grow mainly rice, mid-enders everything 
except rice, and tail-enders mainly wheat, melons, 
and orchards (see Table 3). Direct observation at 
the canal makes this even more obvious. Driving 
from the tail-end to the head-end, one observes 
the area becoming more and more green and the 
choice of crops changing. Close to the intake, rice 
and cotton are planted, whereas these two crops 
are not planted at the tail-end. 
Even if the water distribution in the main canal is 
proportional, this does not necessarily imply that it 
is similar for branch (secondary or tertiary) canals. 
For example, on the Enjil canal, it was stated that 
on branch canals water turns are rotated. A similar 
statement was made for branch canals on the 
Joy Now canal. In the Tatang canal in Nangarhar 
Province, it was stated that every 20 jeribs receive 
a water turn of six hours, but although six hours 
provides enough water for head-end farmers, it is 
not enough for tail-end farmers. On the Kama canal 
either side of the division and flow measurements 
were not taken. This may have been the case in 
Herat Province as well. As the structures were 
fixed at one point in time, they do not necessarily 
represent proportional equity but may represent a 
power balance between sharing parties. 
Proportional or egalitarian distribution only makes 
sense if there is enough water. Although there are 
proportional division structures at certain points 
on the Atishan canal in Herat Province, the canal 
itself is unlined and the water amount during the 
summer months is not enough to supply the entire 
agricultural area along its 60 km length. Because of 
high losses, neither proportional nor equal sharing 
along the canal would make sense. Consequently, 
during the summer only head-end villages receive 
water. Even within head-end villages, proportional 
or egalitarian sharing might not lead to equitable 
outcomes for all villagers. 
The division structure in the Atishan canal shown in 
Photo 04 leads to a total of 60 juft of agricultural 
land. In any given year, there is only water available 
for 20 juft. While one side of the structure supplies 
water to 20 juft, the other side supplies water to 40 
juft. Not having enough water to share it equitably 
every year, the villagers decided to supply only 20 
juft each year. Accordingly, two canals are blocked 
every year. Even though this arrangement sounds 
equitable, a wealthier farmer might have land 
Tatang Canal, Nangarhar ProvincePhoto 3. 
Atishan Canal, Herat ProvincePhoto 4. 
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completely closed but allowed some water to 
run through, the presumption being that this was 
necessary for livestock. 
As far as proportionate off-takes along the main 
canal are concerned, some communities blocked 
the main canal just behind their off-takes to raise 
the water level in the canal so that more water 
was diverted to them. On the Enjil canal, this 
was mainly practiced at the head-end; closer to 
the tail-end, it was no longer observed. Along the 
Enjil canal at three places, canal blockages were 
observed. As Photo 8 shows, these blockages were 
labour and time-intensive and may have also been 
expensive, since sandbags were used. (Another 
in Nangarhar it was expressed differently. There, 
water availability depends on location along the 
main canal: the farther upstream, the smaller the 
water loss. In addition, since there was no rotation 
along the main canal, the shorter the branch canal, 
the quicker the cycle of rotation within the branch 
canal and therefore the more water was available. 
It is questionable whether rotation is really 
practiced. Walking along one branch of the Joy Now 
canal, which runs through a district city in Herat 
Province, one could see that households on tertiary 
canals diverted the flow of the secondary canal 
into their off-takes (see Photo 5). Since there were 
constructions all the way along the canal, there 
appeared to be no rotation and head-end tertiary 
canals diverted water to their off-takes without 
really considering downstream tertiary canals. 
Similarly on the Kama canal in Nangarhar Province 
(see Photo 6), the mirab gave the impression that 
there are fixed turns between different off-takes. 
However, visiting different off-takes, one got the 
impression that there were constant negotiations 
that led to flexible solutions, but no strict 
enforcement of any rotations. 
Notwithstanding, the closer one approached to the 
tail-end of the canal, the more strict the system 
seemed to become, and even drainage water was 
shared and rotated (see Photo 7). Nevertheless, 
even the small drainage branch canals were not 
Joy Now Canal, Herat ProvincePhoto 5. 
Kama Canal, Nangarhar ProvincePhoto 6. 
Kama Canal, Nangarhar ProvincePhoto 7. 
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may consist of different technologies. Hence, the 
system is diverse and must be seen as technologically 
dynamic. This puts into question the emphasis on 
equity of timing in previous studies. If an off-take is 
granted a certain time slot for opening, the labour 
required to open and close it may differ from that 
required for other off-takes. Water may run through 
straight away or slowly. In addition, the sizes of 
the off-takes differ, another reason that rotation 
according to equal timing does not necessarily lead 
to an equal amount of water being delivered. 
Photos 10, 11 and 12 show examples of 
nonproportionate systems on the Asqalan canal and 
the Aliabad canal.
Even though mirabs stated in discussions that there 
are certain rules of timing and that each individual 
farmer has the same time amount allocated to him 
or her, it appears that the situation along the main 
canal is quite different. The questions focused on 
the water-scarce period in order to better highlight 
the differences between head-end, mid-end, and 
tail-end. As a mirab bashi on the Aliabad canal in 
Kunduz Province expressed it, “During spring, there 
is no water problem; everybody can take water 
when they need it” (and thus there are no sharing 
problems between head-, mid-, and tail-enders). 
The situation is very different during the summer, 
when the water resources are scarcer. On the 
Shabaz-ne-Branch canal in Kapisa Province, it was 
factor may also be at work: since at the head-end 
an international organisation had just made the 
off-takes permanent structures, it is possible that 
these off-takes had been fixed in such a way that 
former allocations changed.177) Similar blockages 
were observed along the Gow Mali canal in Takhar 
Province (see Photo 9). 
The nonproportional system
Nonproportional systems were visited in Kunduz, 
Kapisa, Takhar, Baghalan and Laghman provinces 
(this does not imply that these systems are 
nonproportional at all levels or that proportional 
systems are not present in these provinces). In 
nonproportional systems, the water share is not 
fixed through infrastructure (water dividers), 
but water users open and close their off-takes at 
certain times. During the visits, it became obvious 
that off-takes differ even within a single canal; this 
leads to different levels of water control and needs 
different labour input for operating the off-take. 
Thus, it is not possible to generalise about water 
control in the system; a locally constructed system 
177 The wakil of the Enjil canal had been in his position for two years. 
It was stated that the new governor, who had taken up his position 
three years previously, selected the wakil; it was not the choice of the 
shora. Discussions with the engineers who facilitated the research in 
Herat Province explained that the governor favoured a small village 
further downstream that was not yet connected to the canal. It was 
stated that it was in the governor’s interest for the village to receive 
water through the Enjil canal. The wakil had already dug up more soil 
from the canal and had blocked some off-takes midstream in Herat 
city, so that more water could be available for downstream, the plan 
being to extend the canal to the village.
Enjil Canal, Herat ProvincePhoto 8. Gow Mali Canal, Takhar ProvincePhoto 9. 
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Asqalan Canal, Kunduz ProvincePhoto 11. 
Aliabad Canal, Kunduz ProvincePhoto 12. 
Asqalan Canal, Kunduz ProvincePhoto 10. 
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difference in terms of water sharing and the amount 
of losses within the canal system, “If you have 1 m3 
at the head-end it would be reduced to 0.2 m3 at 
the tail-end.”179 Therefore, even if an equal time 
were allocated between head- and tail-end, the 
very length of the canal and the resulting losses 
make an equal-time share agreement inequitable 
in terms of water actually delivered to the field. 
This supports the reasoning of Lee and Anderson180 
that the same time allocation of water supply can 
lead to different amounts of water and therefore of 
irrigated land at the head- and tail-end. 
In addition to the inequity along the long canals, 
on the two shorter canals (Arab Ha in Kunduz 
and Ghorian in Herat) the system of sharing was 
also nonproportional considering the distribution 
infrastructure, but proportional because it was 
based on a rotational principle. In the Ghorian 
canal, there was a rotation of 20 minutes water 
supply for every jerib. It appears that because the 
canal was relatively short the losses within the 
system were not that extensive. Nevertheless, the 
mirab was not concerned about the equity issue or 
whether 20 minutes would be enough for tail-end 
farmers saying, “It is the farmer’s problem if the 
amount of water is not enough.” The reason for 
the unconcern appeared to be the availability of 
an alternative: groundwater. The mirab explained 
that within the system there were approximately 
150 tube wells. The proximity to Herat city made 
the use of groundwater for vegetable production 
profitable. It seemed that groundwater was a 
reliable alternative to an uncertain or scare surface 
water supply. Farmers were more in control and 
could get water for their crops when they needed 
it most. 
Whereas some of the off-takes along the main canal 
are fixed, and therefore it might be easy to account 
for how much water is taken, this appears more 
179 Whether the example exaggerates the real losses is not that 
important; it is more important for this study whether or not the 
mirabs or mirab bashis have the perception that system is fair, and 
they do not. It is also important for the interventionist to see how 
mirabs or mirab bashis want to change this situation. The answer is 
simple: by new technology that does not challenge the current water 
allocation system. 
180 Lee, “Social Water Management”; Anderson, “Irrigation 
Systems.”
stated that, during the period of scarcity, head-
enders could take water during the day and tail-
enders during the night.178 Even though the principle 
of equity in timing appears to apply, the mirab 
admitted that the system is still inequitable, since 
the canal was quite long and the same amount of 
time did not produce the same amount of water 
for head-end and tail-end users. For the Nahr-i-
Khafa canal in Kapisa Province, it was stated that 
head-enders receive water during the day and mid-
enders at night and tail-enders do not receive any 
water. The mirab explained that, even before the 
war, there were more villages and agricultural land 
downstream. However, because of a narrowing of 
the canal and the construction of micro-hydropower 
plants in head- and mid-end villages, the water 
supply to the tail-end decreased to such an extent 
that the agricultural land was abandoned and the 
villagers moved away. In this sense, what were 
before mid-enders are now considered to be tail-
enders. 
The situation in the Aliabad canal in Kunduz Province 
was also different. Here it was stated that there was 
a rotation cycle of seven days, during which head- 
and mid-enders received water for two days each 
and three days were allocated to tail-enders. The 
mirab bashi explained that head- and mid-enders 
considered this fair, taking into consideration the 
length of the canal and resulting water losses. 
However, the mirab bashi and the group of elders 
participating in the discussion did not consider that 
this arrangement was fair. They stated that there 
was more agricultural land at the tail-end, a fact 
that was apparently not considered by the head- 
and mid-enders. Consequently, not all tail-end areas 
receive water during the period of water scarcity. 
In the pictures above of the Asqalan canal in Kunduz 
Province (Photos 10 and 11), it is questionable 
whether head-end permanent off-takes are closed 
and whether closure of nonpermanent structures 
actually stops, or only reduces, water supply to 
head-end branch canals. 
In Kabul Province, in the Shaxardata canal system, 
the mirab bashi gave an example to explain the 
178 The mirab identified the usual three different groups of canal 
users but said that during the period of scarcity, the mid-enders joined 
either the head-end or tail-end group depending on which was closer.
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flexible. This also puts into question whether the 
mirab really deals with disputes. On the Tatang 
canal in Nangarhar Province, it was stated that the 
“mirab has only the function of a judge, but does 
not have that much responsibility.” In the Nahr-i-
Shaid canal in Laghman Province, the mirab stated, 
“If a small amount is taken, nobody bothers.” If it 
is a larger amount, the police are called in, and a 
fine has to be paid to the police just for coming. 
However, there is no compensation for the farmer 
who does not receive the water. On the Kama canal 
in Nangarhar as well as on the Nahr-i-Khafa canal in 
Kapisa Province it was stated that a fine has to be 
paid. Whereas on the Kama canal it was stated that 
the fine could be either money or food paid to the 
malik, on the Nahr-i-Khafa canal it was stated that 
the fine could be between 500 and 5,000 Afghanis, 
which has to be paid to the mirab bashi, who divides 
it between his assistants. When asked whether the 
farmer who did not receive water is compensated, 
the mirab bashi replied: 
If the tail-end farmer complains to me about 
why I spend his money and that it was his 
right, the tail-end farmer will be beaten by 
the head-end farmer who took the water. If a 
farmer asks for compensation, the mirab will 
not work honestly for him the next day.182 
182 Informal interview, 12 September 2007.
difficult along the secondary or tertiary canals. 
Here, water is either diverted directly to the field 
by blocking the canals completely or even further 
divided by proportional diversions. Depending on 
the size of the canals, taking the water turn is more 
difficult and different material is used. 
The blockage shown in Photo 13 was illicit. The 
mirab solved the argument between the farmers. 
The imposed agreement was a compromise that 
allowed the farmer who took the illicit turn to 
continue and only partly gave water to the next 
farmer (see Photo 14). It was an ad hoc decision 
by the mirab and left both farmers unsatisfied. 
Thomas181 reasoned that he did not find cases of real 
time schedules and structured rotation. According 
to him, early in the morning the mirabs decide who 
needs water most urgently, but there is no strict 
order or planning. 
In some cases, behind off-takes, water was divided 
on the tertiary level between farmers (see Photo 
15), but at this level it appeared to be up to the 
farmers to decide how they shared the water, based 
either on a fixed rotation or on a needs approach. 
In the literature, it is stated that the mirab is 
responsible for dispute resolution. This was partly 
confirmed during the interviews. However, as 
discussed above, it seems that the system is quite 
181 Vincent Thomas, Participatory Management of Irrigation System 
(PMIS) project, Informal interview, 18 September 2007.
Laqai Canal, Kunduz ProvincePhoto 14. Laqai Canal, Kunduz ProvincePhoto 13. 
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were large differences in terms of water allocation 
between the different canals during the water-
scarce months of summer: The further downstream, 
the smaller the proportion of villages that were 
supplied with water. Hence, while on the upstream 
canals (Lalkande, Perdelak, and Madrassa) all 
villages were supplied, in downstream canals only 
the head-end villages received water. The mirab 
bashi explained: “The main problem is that there 
is just not enough water. Therefore, downstream 
villages cannot get water. This is based on an old 
agreement; people downstream cannot get water. 
This situation is similar within villages.”
In Kunduz, Nangarhar, Kapisa and Herat Provinces 
different intakes were visited. Whereas the intakes 
for Kapisa are fixed, in Herat the Hari Rot dries 
up, and the water only reaches the surface again 
at certain places; this water is then diverted into 
irrigation canals.183  The situation is quite different 
in the systems visited in Kunduz and Nangarhar 
provinces. At least in the irrigation schemes visited, 
farmers blocked large parts of the river to divert 
water into their intake. See Photo 16.
183 The engineers who accompanied the researcher explained that 
this practice causes large problems. Canal communities rent bulldozers 
to extend the canal and to divert more water. A consequence of this 
practice is that during the spring season the Hari Rot brings more 
water close to the riverbanks and therefore causes flooding of nearby 
agricultural land. In certain places the Hari Rod even splits into two 
rivers that run parallel to each other.
Water sharing between canals 6.3 
With the exception of the Shaxardata canal scheme 
in Kabul Province (six canals under one mirab bashi, 
see Figure 3) and the Nahr-i-Afghan canal scheme 
in Kapisa Province (three canals under one mirab 
bashi), all the other canals visited consisted of one 
main canal with different branch canals. Whereas 
in the Nahr-e Afghan canal scheme the focus of the 
research was on one canal only, in Kabul Province 
the focus was on the sharing agreement between 
the different canals.
As Figure 6 indicates, even though the management 
of the six canals was under one mirab bashi, there 
Nahr-i-Shaid Canal, Laghman ProvincePhoto 15. 
Tarbas Kusar Canal, Kunduz ProvincePhoto 16. 
 Shaxardata canal scheme, Kabul ProvinceFigure 3.
 
Frezabad canal 
8 paws, 600 jerib, 5 
villages 
In summer 3 villages 
take water. 
Madrassa canal 
32 paws, 2400 jerib, 
4 villages 
In summer all 4 
villages take water. 
Karizmir canal 
42 paws, 3150 jerib, 
18 villages 
In summer 7 villages 
take water. 
Intifat canal 
22 paws, 1650 jerib, 
6 villages  
In summer 1 village 
takes water. 
Mirab bashi 
Note: flow/volume to area under which water 
rights or turns are allocated on main canals
Lalkande canal
2 paws, 150 
jerib, 1 village
In summer the 
village takes 
water.
Frezabad canal
8 paws, 600 jerib, 
5 villages
In summer 3 villages 
take water.
Intifat canal
22 paws, 1650 
jerib, 6 villages 
In summer 1 village 
takes water.
Karizmir canal
42 paws, 3150 jerib, 
18 villages
In summer 7 villages 
take water.
Madrassa canal
32 paws, 2400 
jerib, 4 villages
In summer all 
villages take water.
Perdelak canal
2 paws, 150 jerib, 
1 village
In summer the 
village takes water.
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province were mentioned, but these were due to 
the construction and operation of a new reservoir.186 
Distinguishing between different canals may be 
problematic, because canals are also linked. 
Abundance of flow in one canal may be diverted 
either back into the river or into different main 
canals, as seen in Herat, Laghman and Kunduz 
provinces. Alternatively, as was the case of the 
Nahr-i-Shaid canal in Laghman, head-enders 
and mid-enders used only one source (the river) 
throughout the year. Tail-enders used the water 
from this source only in summer; in spring they 
used water from a wash. 
Because of the interconnectedness of canals (see 
Photo 19), it may not be possible to speak about 
one canal system. Thomas187 stated that one could 
not necessarily speak about a fixed water right, but 
only about the right to receive water from a certain 
canal. Furthermore, how much water the right 
entails is not fixed. As he pointed out, a tail-end 
farmer may know that the water he or she receives 
has been diverted from a different canal, but would 
not be able to ask for more water from the mirab 
bashi of that other canal system, only from his or 
her own canal’s mirab bashi.
 Cooperation on maintenance 6.4 
Previous studies have suggested that there is 
186 Informal interview, 10 September 2007.
187 Thomas, PMIS, Informal interview, 18 September 2007.
Photos 17 and 18 show constructions reaching far 
into the river. It appears logical that these would 
cause conflicts between upstream and downstream 
main canals. However, only at the Tatang canal was 
it stated that such conflicts existed.184  “Downstream 
villagers come to our intake to destroy the intake 
structure; our mirab is only at the intake to protect 
and to look after it.” Sayed Hussaun Hashami, a 
social mobilisation specialist with the Kunduz River 
Basin Program,185 said that mirabs and shoras from 
Kunduz Province went to the Province Irrigation 
Department and to the Province Governor and 
together they went to an upstream province to 
ask whether some water could be released for the 
downstream canals. In the Nahr-e Afghan canal 
scheme of Kapisa Province, conflicts with a different 
184 Meeting with elders, 28 September 2007.
185 Informal interview, Kunduz, 17 September 2007.
Enjil Canal, Herat ProvincePhoto 19. 
Asqalan Canal, Kunduz ProvincePhoto 17. 
Tatang Canal, Nangarhar ProvincePho o 18. 
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villages do not always attend the hashar work.”188 
Similarly, on the Tatang canal in Nangarhar and the 
Pacha Joi canal in Laghman, it was stated that the 
head-enders only contributed raw materials and 
wood for the intake.  
On the Kama canal in Nangarhar, it was said that 
head-end villages participate in the hashar work, 
but “the number of people participating is half the 
number participating from the tail-ender.” A similar 
statement was made about the Gow Mali canal in 
Takhar Province. Here it was explained that tail-
enders had to contribute one person for every 
five jerib and mid-enders one person for every 
ten jerib; head-enders were not even mentioned. 
On the Shaxardata canal scheme in Kunduz it was 
said that tail-enders contribute more maintenance 
because they depend more than other users on the 
functioning of the canal. 
On the other hand, on the Aliabad canal in Kunduz 
the tail-end contribution was one person for 40 
jeribs and the mid-end contribution was one person 
for 20 jeribs. The mirab bashi stated that this system 
is based on old agreements and that it is accepted 
by all. Thomas189 reasoned that even though these 
old agreements exist, participation in maintenance 
work in the main canal is mostly ensured by tail-
enders when they need water most urgently, which 
does not really match with old agreements. 
Nonconsumptive uses: Micro- 6.5 
 hydropower plants
Canal management faces a new challenge: the 
integration of a rising number of nonconsumptive 
water users such as flour mills and micro-hydropower 
plants. In the past, the nonconsumptive users were 
regulated in their construction and operation.190 
However, with decreasing support for the farming 
communities from higher administrative levels 
and the failure of local agreements, these 
nonconsumptive users are a serious challenge for 
canal management. Today, an increasing number of 
188 Informal interview, 10 September 2007.
189 Thomas, PMIS, Informal interview, 18 September 2007.
190 See also Water Law 1981.
proportional equity in contribution on maintenance 
work (hashar): the bigger the landholding, the 
greater the obligation to contribute. Although this 
could be the case within individual villages along 
a canal, it appears that the labour contribution is 
inequitable from one village to the next. In most of 
the canals, a clear difference was made in terms 
of hashar contribution between head, mid and tail-
end villages. 
On a main canal, maintenance and cleaning are 
organised either from intake to tail-end or from 
tail-end to intake. In either case, communities 
contribute maintenance work in the area relevant 
to them. If the maintenance work starts at the 
tail-end, the tail-end village starts and is joined 
on the way by other village communities, but mid-
enders or head-enders do not clean the tail-end of 
the canal. If the work starts at the intake, then all 
communities might join (although sometimes the 
head-enders do no maintenance work at all) and 
clean as far as their own area. When workers from 
a village reach their village boundary, they leave 
the work group. In this respect, the tail-enders 
endures the most of the work. 
As an exception to this practice, it was reported 
for the Shahabudin canal in Baghlan Province 
that head-, mid-, and tail-enders clean only their 
respective areas, although all worked on the intake 
together. The shorter canals visited (Arab Ha in 
Kunduz Province and Ghorian in Herat Province) also 
seemed to be exceptions where all communities 
work together canal. 
The head-enders appear to have a special position 
when it comes to hashar. In the Shaxardata canal 
system it was stated that head-enders do not 
contribute to maintenance work but supply the 
working groups with food during their work at the 
intake and in the head-end areas. In the Shabaz-ne-
Branch canal in Kapisa Province, it was explained 
that head-end villages do not do hashar work 
but that a small percentage of them contribute 
wood during work on the intake. This contribution 
exempts them from contributing to the salary of the 
mirab and participating otherwise in the work. More 
generally, one person interviewed said, “upstream 
does not contribute to hashar work, and mid-end 
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a tail-end farmer broke the wheel of a micro-
hydropower plant. In the ensuing conflict, a farmer 
was killed. Now the tail-end community is waiting 
for the support of the government to regulate the 
construction and operation of mills and micro-
hydropower plants. 
The role of the mirabs and their assistants appears 
not to be straightforward. On the Aliabad canal in 
Kunduz Province, two kok bashis started arguing 
when visiting an off-take to a flour mill. The kok 
bashi from the tail-end accused the kok bashi from 
the mid-end of making deals with the mill owner 
that allowed too much water to be diverted. 
poorly designed and badly located structures are 
threatening irrigation water availability for tail-
enders (see Photo 20 and Photo 21). This unregulated 
usage drains water from the main canal out of the 
system in its head and middle reaches.
On different canals, the mirabs complained about 
the micro-hydropower plants and said that they 
do not have the power to stop or to regulate their 
use. On the Nahr-i-Khafa canal in Kapisa, it was 
stated that different off-takes divert water from 
the main canal to micro-hydropower plants, which 
return it to a different canal, the Khoram canal. 
The mirab bashi said that three or four years ago 
Gow Mali Canal, Takhar ProvincePhoto 21. Pacha Joi Canal, Laghman ProvincePhoto 20. 
47
Water Strategy Meets Local Reality
would help confirm the organisation’s authority and 
therefore put them at risk of losing water rights; 
however, it is doubtful that the communities are 
aware of the Draft Water Law. Overall, it appears 
that the stakeholders are selected in a top-down 
process and represent a western perception of who 
should be included. Similarly, it appears that the 
meetings are very much driven by the international 
experts who attend them and not by the local 
communities that are invited. 
When the GTZ team leader was asked how, for 
example in case of drought, agreement was to 
be reached at the basin or sub-basin level on 
transferring or relinquishing rights, no specific 
answer was given, only that decisions would be 
reached through dialogue. An alternative term for 
dialogue is negotiation. Reducing the allocation of 
a scarce resource to one stakeholder for the benefit 
of another is likely to produce conflict, and the more 
scarcity, the more conflict. When the same question 
was asked in Kunduz, the answer was “we are not yet 
that far.” The meeting reports show that the main 
users (canal communities) are under-represented 
or not represented at all, since different canal 
communities participated in different meetings.192 
As long as the currently represented stakeholders 
are not harmed significantly by the decisions taken, 
decision-making may be easy; but problems may 
arise when these decisions have to be enforced. 
According to KRBP, there have been some local 
initiatives across province borders, but not through 
192 In review comments on this report, Osenberg explained, “In each 
sub-basin working group there are 2-4 WUA representatives of the 15 
official members (along with 2-6 upper catchment representatives). 
They do not always come and therefore NGOs working in the Social 
Water Management component of KRBP are being requested to provide 
more support to the attendance. In the beginning this was a task 
the Water Management Departments to be carried out. Nowadays 
SWM NGOs and WMD do so and representation increases.” Canal 
representatives represent only their own canals, not the agricultural 
sector as a whole. Furthermore, the fact that the canal communities 
do not participate, or have to be encouraged to participate, might be 
a sign that the issues discussed at these meetings are not relevant for 
the individual canal units.
Policy and Law Meet Local  7. 
 Reality
This section discusses the interface between policy 
and the situation on the ground.
The basin councils7.1 
Since the Kunduz River Basin Program (KRBP) is 
the only basin programme so far, interviews were 
conducted with the project leader in Kunduz 
and the GTZ team leader in Kabul. In Kabul, it 
was stated that GTZ developed the idea for the 
programme and worked hard to get it accepted 
by the Ministry of Energy and Water. Similar to the 
Water Sector Strategy, it was explained, the basin 
councils will include different stakeholders from 
all sectors. According to the programme strategy, 
all stakeholders within the basin will be equally 
represented since water resources are the concern 
of all. This was confirmed in the project area in 
Kunduz. Existing allocations between the different 
stakeholders were not taken into consideration, since 
90 percent of all the water is used in agriculture. 
It was stated that different identified stakeholder 
groups had been invited to participate. 
To provide a better understanding of the programme 
meetings, KRBP provided copies of the meeting 
reports (see the sample reports in Annexes 2 and 
3).191 From the reports it appears that the local 
mirabs are hardly represented, and when they are, 
it is mainly from a particular set of canals (which 
are covered by the KRBP social water management 
projects). There could be several reasons for the 
absence of other mirabs: attending the meetings 
might carry a high transaction cost, so that only 
the elite participate; local communities may stay 
away because they do not see the relevance of the 
working groups; or their representatives may just 
not have been invited. Another possibility is that 
communities might fear that their participation 
191 The Taloqan Sub-Basin Working Group meeting reports were 
particularly recommended.
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introduced or would have no meaning. In addition, 
since the canal systems may be interconnected 
or water may be diverted back into the river (for 
example, after use by micro-hydropower plants) 
and then can be used by other communities, it 
would be important to measure not only how much 
water is diverted into the canal system, but also 
how much water leaves the system again. 
Thus, if the permit is held by the WUA, simply 
measuring how much reaches the WUA could give 
a wrong impression of the actual usage within 
the system. This point is becoming even more 
important because of the rise of micro-hydropower 
plants, which do not consume water as such. Even 
though the Draft Water Law of June 2008 mentions 
micro-hydropower plants, and the current water 
usage of a canal is supposed to be reflected in the 
permit, it seems that an additional distinction is 
needed between consumptive and nonconsumptive 
uses. On the other hand, in situations in which each 
individual farmer receives a permit, it seems that 
neither is the technology in place to measure water 
use nor is the control in place to deliver the amount 
stated in the permit. 
The Draft Water Law states that irrigation norms 
should be determined and that permits can 
be modified. If only WUAs receive permits, a 
modification could imply a reduction of water for 
the individual canal. Since water within the canal 
is not shared equitably between head-, mid-, and 
tail-enders, a reduction might only affect tail-
enders. Furthermore, it is not evident whether 
setting irrigation norms and modifying permits 
would take into account nonconsumptive use by 
micro-hydropower plants and rice mills.
The creation of WUAs 7.3 
The literature review and fieldwork have highlighted 
the extreme inequity of the current system. The 
western concept of WUAs is based on democracy 
and equity between users. This concept appears to 
be in direct contradiction to the system currently 
practiced. As a consequence, the transaction costs 
of implementing WUAs (as they are meant to be 
according to blueprints) might be high, since it 
the basin working group. Mirabs and shoras from a 
downstream province went to an upstream province 
to ask for extra water. They first approached 
the governor of the downstream province, who 
accompanied them to the upstream province 
governor. Additional water releases were agreed 
on, but they only lasted for a few days. Whether the 
arrangement was equitable between all water users 
in the two provinces is questionable. According to 
Thomas:193 
In the current locally contested status of 
inequity of water distribution at canal level 
(between head and tail-end), talking about 
releasing water from the upstream schemes 
of the basin towards the downstream schemes 
would imply that one deprives downstream 
water users of an upstream basin scheme for 
the benefit of an upstream water user in a 
downstream basin scheme. Thus one does not 
solve anything and exacerbate the tensions.
Mahmoudzadeh Varzi conducted a research study 
with KRBP from 1 March to 22 May 2008. Her findings 
confirm these initial observations, but go into more 
detail.194 
The Draft Water Law: Challenges 7.2 
 to implementation
Within the Draft Water Law, it is not evident who 
will hold a permit, the WUA or the individual farmer. 
As the fieldwork data show, the canal community 
cannot determine how much is diverted from the 
river into the canal, nor can the individual farmer 
determine how much water reaches his or her field. 
The technology is just not in place to measure 
water use.195 Without it, a permit system cannot be 
193 Thomas, PMIS, informal interview, 18 September 2007.
194 M. Mahmoudzadeh Varzi and K. Wegerich, “Much Ado about 
Nothing: Sub-Basin Working Groups in Kunduz Basin, Afghanistan,” in 
Central Asian Waters: Social, Economic, Environmental and Governance 
Puzzle, ed. M.M. Rahaman and O. Varis (Water and Development 
Publications TKK-WD-02, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, 
Finland, 2008), 47-61.
195 In review comments on this report, Osenberg stated that new 
intake infrastructure should have discharge measurement facilities. 
However, this was not observed during visits to different inlets outside 
the KRBP area.
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Even though the February 2008 Draft WSS refers to 
international blueprints for WUAs, the June 2008 
Draft Water Law leaves it open whether the new 
irrigation associations would adapt these blueprints 
or continue current practices. Furthermore, at least 
according to the Draft Water Law, the associations’ 
focus on irrigation would exclude other uses, such as 
micro-hydropower plants, mills, livestock watering, 
and household drinking water. To be effective, and 
because reference is made to IWRM, WUAs should 
integrate these different uses. 
International projects 7.4 
One focus of the Draft WSS is the construction or 
rehabilitation of irrigation systems. International 
and national irrigation infrastructure projects had 
been implemented on many of the canal systems 
visited during the research for this paper. The 
intakes for both the Nahr-i-Afghan canal scheme 
in Kapisa and the Tatang canal in Nangarhar (see 
Photo 22) were permanent structures. 
As mentioned in the discussion of maintenance in 
Section 6.4, head-enders often only contribute at 
the intake by supplying wood for construction. If 
an international or national organisation makes 
the intake a permanent structure, it may further 
increase the inequity, since head-enders will no 
longer have to contribute wood. One could argue, 
however, that mid- and tail-end communities will 
would imply that the current system of existing 
rights, which often privileges head-end users, 
should be renegotiated. 
That there are differences in water distribution 
between head and tail-end villages has apparently 
already been considered in the way agricultural 
land is and was taxed.196 According to Abdul Rahim, 
an FAO irrigation engineer, head-end users pay 
more tax than tail-end users, with agricultural land 
divided into three categories: high-grade upstream 
land with an ample water supply, medium-grade 
midstream land with less water, and low-grade 
downstream land or land that is often rocky and 
located near the mountains.197 This difference, 
according to Rahim, is also reflected in the current 
prices for agricultural land, “When a person wants 
to buy agricultural land the water right of the land 
might be stated in the document. This is traditional 
law not written law, each land has to be sold or 
bought with the indication of the water right.”198 
These observations were confirmed in different 
discussions with the engineers who accompanied 
this researcher in the field and even in the Ministry 
for Energy and Water. Since taxes are different for 
head-, middle-, and tail-enders, the WUA rules of 
equitable sharing may create a different form of 
inequity. Therefore, the tax regulation would have 
to be changed (although it is questionable whether 
the current tax rules are implemented). In addition, 
given the fact that the price of land at the head-end 
reflects its favourable position, a change in rules 
could cause a sharp price decrease. Therefore, it 
would seem appropriate for these landholders to 
be compensated if new rules for equitable sharing 
were enforced. 
Given frequent statements by mirabs that there 
is not enough water, and the water loss caused by 
poor canal conditions, it is questionable whether 
equitable sharing makes sense in every situation. 
In some cases, such as the Atishan canal, equitable 
sharing of water could sharply reduce crop 
production.  
196 See Lee, “Water Resource Management on the Balkh Ab River.”
197 Email message to author, 25 September 2007.
198 Email message to author, 25 September 2007.
Tatang Canal, Nangarhar ProvincePhoto 22. 
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they might have to pay more taxes. Therefore, 
the amount of land mentioned to the national or 
international organisation may not reflect reality. 
The construction, however, took into account what 
farmers said about their landholdings and may 
therefore result in them getting less water than 
they would otherwise be entitled to.  
National or international projects are not always 
constructed in the best way and can therefore have 
negative effects on communities. For example, in 
the Atishan canal in Herat Province, the gates were 
installed too high above ground (see Photo 25) and 
the crest was not completely horizontal and had 
an inclination. To make things worse, the seasonal 
have to work less as well. At this point, it is not 
clear whether a fixed construction has an equal 
impact on all users’ maintenance contributions 
or whether it has more advantages for one group. 
In addition, one would have to question what the 
impact of a fixed intake might be on downstream 
communities. In the Nahr-i-Afghan canal scheme, 
the mirabs complained that a small upstream dam 
resulted in floods not being equitably shared and 
more negative impacts from the spring floods being 
felt in their canal scheme. They complained that the 
dam was operated in such a way that the summer 
scarcity was not equitably shared either, but that 
the water was diverted into a different district. 
In addition to construction at the intakes, projects 
were implemented within the canal system. For 
example, on the Tatang canal, proportional water 
dividers were constructed (see Photos 23 and 
24). This was difficult to understand, especially 
because, as the head of the shora explained, the 
amount of land behind any division point was not 
precisely determined and water was not measured. 
Therefore, it appeared that any such divisions 
were negotiated. Whether the negotiation led 
to an equitable sharing or was more a reflection 
of the current power distribution is unclear; the 
construction could have resulted in inequity. 
On the Kama canal in Nangarhar Province, a 
different problem was highlighted. Here the shora 
stated that farmers were afraid that, when they 
revealed the real extent of their landholdings, 
Tatang Canal, Nangarhar ProvincePhoto 23. 
Tatang Canal, Nangarhar ProvincePhoto 24. 
Atishan Canal, Herat ProvincePhoto 25. 
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construction, two upstream villages were excluded 
from the system and could only receive water from 
the first intake during the spring. Since only two 
communities were affected, it was not seen as a 
problem by the other communities; therefore, 
there was no attempt to rectify the situation for 
them.
In addition, Thomas pointed out that, with the 
rise of international and national projects, canal 
communities are waiting for assistance with 
maintenance work.199 The advantage is that the 
labour contribution is paid for. This was also the 
case on the Nahr-i-Shaid canal in Laghman Province, 
where it was stated that the canal had not been 
properly cleaned for 20 years. An international 
project paid for maintenance and, for three months, 
550 local labourers were employed. There may 
be a danger that outside funding of maintenance 
work will lead to a deterioration of the canals as 
communities may be waiting for funding rather 
than participating in annual unpaid cleanings. 
The experience of PMIS in the  7.5 
 Kunduz Basin
In November 2005, the Participatory Management 
of Irrigation Systems (PMIS) project was launched 
in both Said and Zargar canals in Takhar Province. 
As the social water management component of 
the KRBP, the programme was initiated by the 
government of Afghanistan and funded by the 
European Community. One of the PMIS project’s 
key mandates was to facilitate the revival and 
improvement of collective water management 
practices, possibly through the formation of canal-
level WUAs and the building of linkages between 
water users and new external agencies such as sub-
basin agencies and councils. 
The PMIS project had two phases. The first lasted 
ten months (December 2005 to September 2006). 
Its purpose was to get an understanding of the 
evolution of water access problems at canal level 
over the past decades and of local roles and 
responsibilities and collective water management 
199 Thomas, PMIS, informal interview, 18 September 2007.
wash was not considered. The combination led 
to high siltation levels, even blockages in the 
canal, and would have let to inequitable water 
distribution. When the project ran out of money, a 
different organisation took over and suggested the 
construction of a siphon. 
On the Kama canal in Nangarhar Province, the 
construction of an intake (Photo 26) led to a 
situation in which no water could be diverted 
during the summer into the canal system. The 
communities came together and constructed an 
intake themselves (Photo 27) 500 meters further 
downstream. As a consequence of the new 
Kama Canal, Nangarhar ProvincePhoto 26. 
Kama Canal, Nangarhar ProvincePhoto 27. 
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and supports the mirab, and to determine rules for 
the construction and operation of mills and micro-
hydropower plants.
The long research phase also led to the understanding 
that current water sharing arrangements are 
contested, that fixed water rights per jerib or per 
maintenance contribution do not exist, but that the 
current arrangement is crop-specific and influenced 
by location within the canal system, the existing 
irrigation infrastructure, the former influence of 
the Agricultural Department and some local water-
sharing arrangements. Setting turns between sub-
canals and within sub-canals is only needed in 
tail-end areas with higher levels of scarcity and is 
decided on an ad-hoc rather than planned basis. 
The trust and understanding gained through the long 
research period also facilitated that rehabilitation 
of irrigation infrastructure, which was proposed 
by KRBP engineers in cooperation with one of the 
mirabs, in this case with a mirab representing only 
head-end Pashtun communities was reconsidered. 
Participatory design led to a solution that was 
nonoptimal in terms of irrigation efficiency, but was 
considered by the communities to be appropriate 
because it was flexible enough to deal with the 
contested water-sharing agreements along the 
canal. Overall, the extensive participatory design 
for the infrastructure rehabilitation, together with 
ad-hoc research to complement the discussions, 
led to further trust building and strengthened the 
role of PMIS.
Overall, the experience of PMIS suggests that research 
is always necessary before rehabilitating a canal or 
forming a WUA. Water management arrangements 
differed in each canal in the PMIS project. Even 
though some lessons can be transferred to other 
canals, overall it is important to understand local 
complexities. Failure to achieve this understanding 
could lead in the best case to WUAs that are no 
more than paper tigers and in the worst case to an 
increase of water-related conflicts. 
practices. The research entailed individual 
interviews with farmers, mirabs and staff members 
of local government agencies, in particular the 
Water Management Department and Agricultural 
Department. In addition, group discussions with 
farmers, including elders of the different villages, 
were held. To support the interviews, canal maps 
were created and integrated in a GIS system, under 
the guidance of the mirabs, in December 2005. During 
the irrigation season (June to September 2006), 
flow measurements were taken at different points 
along the main canal in order to better understand 
water distribution between head, middle and tail 
ends. Even though the data collected during this 
first phase showed that the two canal systems are 
hydraulically interlinked, in the second phase the 
two canals were treated as separate entities. The 
reason for this was that, according to the local 
practice, users of Zargar have no recognised right 
to the water draining out of the Said canal system.
The fact that PMIS staff began by conducting 
extensive research allowed a good understanding 
of the history of the two canals, the local water 
management practices, the contested water 
sharing situation, the hydraulic property of local 
infrastructure. It became clear that there is not 
one mirab bashi unifying the canal communities in 
either of these canals, but a plurality of mirabs, 
representing different ethnicities, upstream and 
downstream communities, and diverse individual 
large landowners. These different mirabs have 
equal status.200 
Because of the knowledge gained prior to 
implementation, rather than following a blueprint 
for WUA establishment with predefined rules and 
rights, an approach was chosen which focused only 
on issues that were considered important by the 
different communities along the canals. Through 
extensive stakeholder participation, benefiting 
from the prior research findings, consent on various 
issues was reached: for example, to elect only one 
mirab, but also to elect a committee that controls 
200 This finding puts into doubt the findings of earlier AREU research, 
since one mirab was always identified by the local partners as the main 
mirab of the canal. Nevertheless, the conducted research showed that 
these identified mirabs were not always responsible for the whole 
canal.
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reorganisation of MEW and the privatisation of its 
viable organisational components. The February 
2008 Draft WSS less explicitly states as a long-term 
objective “financial autonomy of RBAs and other 
public utility organisations.” Compared to the 
November 2007 version, the June 2008 Draft Water 
Law makes no direct reference to financial autonomy 
for RBAs and RBCs. However, one could interpret 
Article 7 to say that they are service providers and 
thus able to charge for their services. 
Even though the drafts of the WSS highlight the 
potential for participation by end-users and give the 
impression that RBCs will be created using a bottom-
up approach (Figure 2), the June 2008 Draft Water 
Law gives the main power to MEW for “establishing 
bodies for river basins study teams and evaluating 
their activities.” Despite the impression given of 
bottom-up and stakeholder participation, MEW 
might keep the main decision-making power and 
influence. MEW is even responsible for determining 
who will be represented on the river basin and 
sub-basin councils. Therefore, the approach is top-
down. 
Even though there is an indication of who will be 
represented in the councils, there is no statement 
within the Draft Water Law or the drafts of the 
WSS as to how these councils should reach an 
agreement or how the votes in the councils should 
be allocated between the different sectors. Hence, 
it appears likely that representation is not linked 
to actual water utilisation within Afghanistan or 
within a basin. This lack of representation would 
make it questionable whether decisions about 
water redistribution or water rights adjustments 
between beneficiary groups would be acceptable 
to those groups. KRBP documents show that canal 
communities have sometimes not been represented, 
have been under-represented, and in the worst 
cases have not even been present in the current 
sub-basin working groups, which will develop into 
sub-basin councils. 
Conclusion 8. 
The draft Water Sector Strategies have shown 
that Afghanistan takes a mixed approach to water 
management. A modern management approach, 
IWRM, including management according to basin 
boundaries, is promoted, as well as the expansion 
and rehabilitation of the irrigated area. However, the 
drafts of the WSS promote basin-level management 
only within Afghanistan’s boundaries, and it is 
evident that expansion and rehabilitation of the 
irrigated area may have negative consequences for 
neighbouring riparian states as well as for equity 
between and within local communities. In the past, 
Afghanistan did not have the opportunity to expand 
the area under irrigation, so expansion was not 
considered during transboundary water allocations, 
for example in the Amu Darya Basin. The focus on 
expansion is also understandable, given the high 
number of returning refugees. 
Within the July 2007 Draft WSS there appears to be 
a lack of confidence regarding the establishment of 
RBAs and RBCs, their applicability for Afghanistan, 
and the replication of lessons learned from pilot RBAs 
and RBCs. This concern reappears in the February 
2008 Draft WSS, which also underplays the problem 
of enforcement and focuses on governance, but not 
enforcement, for the rural areas. In the June 2008 
Draft Water Law, establishing RBAs and RBCs is not 
optional, and power is supposed to be transferred 
from the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) to 
RBCs. Nevertheless, the exemption for right-of-ways 
completely erodes the basin-level and integrated 
water management approach. Surely, the concerns 
about enforceability expressed in the WSS and the 
treatment of right-of-ways in the Draft Water Law 
reflect the reality on the ground, but then the 
question should be: why focus now, especially in 
the law, on basin management? 
In spite of the concerns regarding applicability 
for Afghanistan, the different drafts of the WSS 
emphasise RBAs and RBCs, and even the July 2007 
Draft WSS stated that, a logical consequence is the 
AREU Issues Paper Series
54
councils have been set up mainly for attracting and 
administering donor funding and external projects, 
but are not necessarily equipped to resolve inter- 
or intra-community disputes. Hence, if it comes to 
renegotiation of existing rights, CDCs may not be 
appropriate representatives of the community. 
There may be some dangers inherent in donor-driven 
community projects. They are an acknowledgement 
that the state is not able to implement projects itself, 
and as such could further weaken the position of the 
state. Donor projects also have their own problems. 
They are bound by time and budget constraints, 
are mainly accountable to the donor community, 
and have to have fixed milestones and outputs. 
Given the unstable environment in Afghanistan, it 
is highly doubtful whether these projects can stick 
to their rigorous plans, and therefore it may not 
be possible to implement them fully. Taking the 
example of PMIS, only longer research led to the 
understanding that existing water infrastructure 
is contested. Hence, simple rehabilitation of the 
existing infrastructure could have increased the 
tension on the canal unit. Another lesson from 
the PMIS project is that canal associations should 
not be established with WUA blueprints but rather 
should focus on rules that are locally identified 
as important, locally acceptable and agreed upon 
by the whole community. The process that led to 
this possibly more sustainable result took a long 
time. It is questionable whether such a process can 
compete with the approach of rapid WUA creation 
and predefined evaluation criteria. 
The communities in the canal systems visited for this 
research demanded the support of the government 
to deal with pressing issues such as micro-
hydropower plants or head-enders who had changed 
to more water-intensive crops such as rice. Thus, 
it appears that there is a need for urgent action. 
This puts into question whether one should wait for 
new organisations (such as river basin councils) to 
be established and functioning or whether existing 
entities such as the irrigation departments or the 
governors should first be empowered, so that they 
could strengthen the mirabs and facilitate the 
enforcement of local rules. 
One positive trend has been the change as the WSS 
An additional problem is the identification of the 
legitimate representatives of water beneficiaries. 
On the one hand, the draft WSS states that the 
mirab system is not functional, and, on the other 
hand, WUAs have not been set up everywhere. 
WUAs did not exist in any of the places visited for 
this research, only mirab systems existed there. 
However, the canal units currently participating in 
the sub-basin working groups are mainly those few 
that benefit from the social water management 
component of KRBP. Hence, it is questionable 
whether and how other canal units could be 
encouraged to participate. It is doubtful that the 
current issues discussed, even issues such as water 
sharing during water scarcity, are always relevant, 
since not all canal units within the sub-basin are 
present at these meetings. 
One way forward would be to use these meetings 
more as a platform in which the canal units can 
raise their concerns and share their experiences 
of the benefits and pitfalls of the social water 
management projects. However, this would 
transform the character of the meetings. On the 
one hand, they would become more an evaluation 
of the programme and the focus might shift from 
sub-basin level to canal level. Nevertheless, it 
might change the character of the meetings from 
top-down to more bottom-up, and therefore 
might make them more relevant for the current 
participants and other canal units who would like 
to learn from their experiences. In the long term, 
the meetings might take on the character originally 
anticipated for them. 
Neither the current mirab system nor the WUAs as 
defined in the Draft Water Law completely represent 
all stakeholder groups. In addition, the mirab system 
is sometimes temporary, emerging during water 
scarcity. As the PMIS experience showed, there is 
also sometimes more than one mirab operating 
on a canal. Hence, it is questionable whether one 
mirab participating in these meetings can represent 
all the different interests within the canal. In 
addition, even though the WSS also mentions the 
currently established community development 
councils (CDCs), it has been argued201 that these 
201 Hamish Nixon, AREU researcher, personal communication, 26 
September 2007.
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longer and will demand rethinking on the part 
of the irrigation departments, to focus not only 
on infrastructure rehabilitation but also on the 
facilitation of dialogue to redefine institutions and 
to make organisations and positions (such as that of 
mirab) workable.  
In the drafts of the WSS, it was pointed out that 
there has not been a detailed study of the current 
local water management system. The literature 
review and the fieldwork for this study have 
highlighted the fact that there are still many gaps 
in knowledge. In fact, the fieldwork highlighted 
new questions that were not previously reflected 
on in the literature. Hence, research should be 
a prerequisite to moving forward with the water 
sector strategy, an aspect that has so far been 
either completely ignored or so marginalised that 
it is easy to miss it. Research is necessary not only 
to better understand the “praiseworthy customs 
and traditions” acknowledged in the WSS, but 
also to enable a water strategy, a water law or 
the implementation of development projects to 
address more thoroughly the current needs of the 
rural communities. The February 2008 Draft WSS 
states as a strategic vision: “To manage the Nation’s 
water resources so as to reduce poverty, increase 
sustainable economic and social development, 
and improve the quality of life for all Afghans and 
to ensure an adequate supply of water for future 
generations.”202 A prerequisite to management, 
however, is knowledge of what has to be managed 
(the resource) and how it is currently managed. 
These two aspects are not sufficiently known. It is 
only by knowing and understanding them that it will 
be possible to develop, since development implies 
that one knows the starting point and can define a 
goal and therefore set realistic milestones. 
202 Draft WSS, February 2008, 17.
has evolved from treating water as an economic 
good (in the July 2007 draft) to treating it as a 
public good and a resource for poverty alleviation 
(in the February 2008 draft). The focus on water 
use permits and irrigation norms has, however, 
remained. Even though this is necessary for 
governmental control and planning, and could 
be considered very modern, it is questionable 
whether it is appropriate for current conditions 
in Afghanistan. Even the technology to measure 
water flow into the canal (not to mention outflow 
or internal distribution) is currently not available. 
Hence, a modern permit system would not be 
possible to implement. Consequently, including 
permits (which might be feasible in the distant 
future under a strong state) in the law now, when 
they may not be enforceable, may even weaken 
water governance. In this respect, the current 
Draft Water Law reads like a water strategy rather 
than a law. It would be necessary first to focus on 
determining how much water is used in the irrigation 
systems before there could be any law on permits. 
Observations on use could lead in the long term to 
a permit system. Even with better knowledge of 
water flows, a permit system will only be viable if 
there is sufficient enforcement capacity. 
Even though it is not evident from the June 2008 
Draft Water Law, the different drafts of the WSS 
seem to accept international blueprints for creating 
WUAs. The appropriateness of this is doubtful. 
Even though the current local management system 
functions only partially and is inequitable along 
the main canal, it appears to be accepted. It was 
previously integrated with the tax system and is 
reflected in the price of land. Given that the mirab 
system is already weakened, one has to critically 
question whether a completely new system, with 
new rules about water allocation and maintenance, 
can be implemented or whether the current 
system has to be strengthened and evened out, 
as previously through the local government. This 
would not require an externally imposed blueprint 
but would allow local communities to decide what 
kinds of rules are appropriate and enforceable. 
This approach was taken by PMIS. That these rules 
will vary between the different canal units is very 
likely, given the differences in water availability, 
infrastructure, and culture. This process will take 
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Annex 1: Major Infrastructural Projects  
Identified Major Infrastructure ProjectsTable 4. 
Name of Projects River Basin Purposes
Implementation, years Cost estimate in Million USD Benefit
Start End Total First 5 years Total  Irrigation ha Power MW
Lower Kokcha irrigation and 
power project, Amu Ir, P, En, Re 1385 1397 12 200 1300 166,000 130
Alishing storage dam project Kabul Ir, Re, FC, En 1387 1393 6 70  100   
Almar storage dam project North Ir, WS, En, FC 1386 1391 5 42 42                     3,000  
Andkhou water supply project Amu WS, En 1386 1389 3 10.5 12.5   
Bakhsh abad storage dam, 
diversion and main canals 
project
Hilmand Ir, FC, P, En, WS, GWR, In, Re 1386 1396 10 150 450 60,000 20
Cheshmashafa storage dam 
project North Ir, P, Re, En, FC 1387 1394 7 70  150
                
200,000  
Dahala dam 2nd phase study, 
design Hilmand Ir, FC, Re, 1388 1403 15     
Dahala dam rehabilitation and 
improvement Hilmand Ir, FC, Re, WS 1387 1395 8 100 183   
Gambiri irrigation and power 
project Kabul Ir, P, En, Re 1386 1392 6 200 250 8,000 10
Gulbahar storage dam project Kabul WS, Ir, FC, P, In, Re, En 1387 1397 10 250 1200
60,000 
also providing 
drinking water 
to the New City 
at Dehsabz
120
Hilmand valey development 
project including Nahr-e Saraj Hilmand Ir, En 1387 1395 8 100 200 48,000  
Kafgan storage dam project Harirod - Morghab Ir, FC, P 1387 1395 8 50  150   
Kajaki (gate installation) 
irrigation and power project Hilmand P, Ir 1387 1390 3 250 250 75,00 110
Kalagoosh storage dam project Kabul Ir, Re 1387 1393 6 120 150
Kama irrigation and power 
project Kabul Ir, P, 1387 1394 7 200 400 12,000 45
Kamal khan flood protection 
diversion project Hilmand FC, Ir, En, Re 1387 1391 4 400 400 119,000 9
Kilagai storage dam project Amu Ir. P, Re, En, In, FP 1386 1393 7 100 350 90,000 50
Machalghoo Storage Dam Hilmand Ir, P, En, FC 1387 1393 6
Pashdan storage dam project Harirod-Morghab
Ir, FC, In, Re, 
En, GWR 1386 1391 5 82 82 5,000
Pump schemes project Amu, Panj Ir 1387 1392 5 30 30 10,000
Salma Storage dam project 
implementation
Harirod-
Morghab Ir, FC, Re, In 1384 1389 5 80 80 73,000 42
Shah wa aroos storage dam 
project Kabul
WS, Ir, P, Re, En, 
In, FC, GWR 1386 1390 4 44 44 3,000 1.5
Shahtoot storage dam and water 
supply Project Kabul
WS, Ir, P, Re, En, 
In, FC 1387 1394 7 100 100
12,000 
Also, provides 
drinking water 
to the first phase 
of the New City 
at Dehsabz
Storage dam on bamyan River Amu Ir, FC, P 1387 1394 7 50 150
90 small and medium size storage 
dams all 1386 1401 15 200 1000 100,000
Upper Amu darya diversion 
project Amu Ir, P, WS, En 1387 1400 13 100 2700 500,000 1000
Worsaj storage dam, irrigation 
and power project Amu Ir, P, En, Re, FC 1387 1397 10 80 250 30,000 50
 Source: Final WSS February 2008: 36-38; (19th March 2008 is the first day of the year 1387 according to the Afghan calander) 
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Annex 2: Minutes of 15th Taloqan Sub Basin Working Group Meeting
Date: 23/7/07
Time: 10:30 – 1:20
Venue: KRBP meeting room, Water Management Department, Kunduz
Present 
# Name Position Concerned Office Phone No Email Membership
1 Eng. M. Salim Akbar Director
Water Management 
Dept Takhar Chairman
2 Mohd Eshaq Tawhidi
Development 
Officer
Environment Protection 
Agency Kunduz Representative
3 Jelle Beekma Team Leader KRBP 0799234448 kunduzriver@yahoo.co.nz Secretary
4 Eng. Saeed Ahmad
Rural Development 
Dept Takhar 0700 709 446 Representative
5 Abdul Subor Water Supply Takhar 077 981 5776 Representative
6 Mohd Rahim Admin and Finance Officer Women Affairs Dept Takhar Representative
7 Hameedullah Credit Officer Electricity Dept Takhar Representative
8 Alahj Ramazani Extension Officer Agriculture Dept Kunduz 0799 254 213 Member 
9 Haji Najibullah Head of Water user Nahri Saeed Member
10 Haji Bik Head of Water user Nahri Zargar Member
12
Engineer 
Safiullah 
Noorzad
Team Leader 
Co-operator KRBP Member
13 Vincent Thomas PMIS Vincent.thomas@akdn-afg.org 
Observer
14 Engineer Abdullah
Engineer, 
Coordinator 
Social
PMIS 070708131 abdullahosmani@akdn-afg.org Observer
15 Naveed Ahmad Administrator Mediotec Kunduz Naveed.ahmad@gmail.com Observer
16 Amin Office Manager KRBP 0799502037 aminanwaree@gmail.com Translator
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Absent 
# Name Position Concerned Office Phone No Email Membership
1 Eng. Lutfudden Hydrology & Water Management officer
Water Management 
Dept Kunduz Member
2 Eng M. Tahir Ayoub Director 
Rural Development 
Dept Takhar Co-chairman
3 Razma ra Hawash Directress
Women Affairs 
Dept Takhar Member 
4 Mirab bashi Naqi Khanabad Member
5 Mirab Shahrawan Takhar Member
Agenda:
Opening1. 
Holy Quran recitation1. 
Review of minutes of last meeting1. 
Discussion of number of seat for sub basin council and representation1. 
AOB1. 
Closure1. 
Topic Description Action
1. Opening by Eng. M. Salim Akbar This meeting was opened by Eng. 
M. Salim Akbar Director of Water 
Management Dept Takhar at 10:30 and 
gave a review of the last meeting.
Engineer Lutfudden/representative 
of Water Management 
Department Kunduz was not 
present in the meeting.
Kunduz Water Management 
Department should officially 
introduce a representative, in case if 
Eng. Lutfudden cannot attend any of 
the meetings.
2. Holy Quran recitation Some verses from holy Quran were 
recited by one of the water users.
3. Review of minutes of last meeting Both English and Dari minutes were 
accepted.
Engineers M. Salim Akbar and Safiullah 
Noorzad to work on preparing a 
new list of permanent members 
from water users canals and line 
departments. 
4. Discussion of number of seat for 
sub basin council and representation 
Description over page Engineers Mohd Salim Akbar and 
Safiullah Noorzad to form a technical 
committee on areas affected by water 
shortage and discuss the problems of 
the water users.
5. AOB No discussion 
This meeting was closed by Engineer Salim the chairman at 1:20pm and next meeting scheduled for 30 
July 07 at 9:00am in Taloqan. 
Lunch was served in KRBP Kunduz.
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Description of discussion of number of seat for sub basin council and representation:
JBeekma Team Leader KRBP talked about water user categories and said that there are 13 sectors of 
water users in the Taloqan sub basin level chosen.
JBeekma presented a map showing different areas with water availability and shortage in the whole 
Taloqan sub basin. He also presented the same map for sub basin Baghlan. The water availability estimation 
is done based on amount of rain and snow melt as the water flows upstream to downstream. He added, 
the calculation was done with the cooperation of the line departments’ representatives, faculty teachers 
of agriculture and water users.
He also said that the areas coloured yellow in the map shows that there is water shortage problem and 
the areas with purple colour says that there is server water shortage problem and those affected areas 
are Taloqan, Bangi and Eshkamesh districts. He added that the problem with the water shortage is not 
because there was no water management but it is because of less melted snow and rain.
He also added, that is why as a technical working group we are gathered to do better water management 
on water consumption and distribution so that the risk in the areas with water shortage is minimized.
Eng Safiullah explained the need to finance the river basin and sub basin councils. He also showed the 
cost estimate based on the payments made for the Taloqan sub basin meeting by KRBP. On basis of the 
results of the water balance and the total water consumption, he showed what the costs would be for 
running the sub basin council if we relate it to the water consumption. This means we would have a 
service fee related to the amount of water consumed. 
For a council of 25 members the fees would be around 0,01 Afs/household/year for domestic water or 
2 afs per village of 200 households. The fees would be approximately 2 Afs/ha, which would mean a fee 
of 3700 Afs for a canal like Nar e Sayed and of 42,000 Afs for Shahrawan. A council of 12 persons would 
result in fees approximately half of this. On basis of these maps and the costs of the council, the group 
is requested to choose the number of seats. The group is also asked to decide how we will fill the seats. 
There are three options:
a. By water user category
b. By representing a catchment or sub basin
c. By a combination of the two
Due to the absence of other line departments and not enough time, the choice could not be made in this 
meeting.
Eng Safiullah re-emphasised the importance of the council as a decision maker on water use and allocation 
issues. The river basin agency, assisted by line departments will advice the council and function as its 
secretariat. Due to the important tasks and the decision-making power of the river basin, the number of 
seats and the mechanism for representation should be considered very carefully. More seats mean better 
representation and democracy, but more difficult decision making and somewhat higher costs.   
Members chose to have 25 members for the sub basin council and decisions on representation of the seats 
postponed to next week meeting: 30 July 07, venue Water Management Department in Taloqan. Members 
were asked to think on representation of the seats.
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Annex 3: Minutes of 13th Taloqan Sub Basin Working Group Meeting
Date: 23rd May 07
Time: 10:30 - 1:40 
Venue: KRBP meeting room of Kunduz
Participants:
Present
# Name Position Concerned Office Contact Membership
1 Eng. M. Salim Akbar Director Water Management Takhar 0799 242 506 Chairman
2 Jelle Beekma Team Leader KRBP 0799 234 448 Secretary 
3 Haji Esmatullah Environment Protection Agency 0700713181 Representative
4 Engineer Nasratullah Rural Development Takhar 0700706651 Representative
5 Hameedullah Dilabar Extensions Officer Agriculture Takhar 0799873525 Member
6 Abdul Satar Director Water Supply Takhar 0799697675 Member
7 Sadrudden Director Environment Protection Agency Takhar 0700719478 Member
8 Eng. Lutfudden
Hydrology and 
Water Management 
Officer
Water Management Kunduz 0799 394 942 Member
9 Zai Boy Mirab Shahrawan Takhar Member
10 Najibullah Rep Upper Catchment Upper Catchment Farkhar 0700598700 Member
11 Abdul Zahir Rep Upper Catchment PEEP Member
12 Haji Abdul Ghafour Community Leader Chal Takhar Member
13 Abdul Rahim Community Leader Khanabad Member
14 Hoshang Prog Assistant PEEP Observer
15 Noor Mohd Head of Water Management District Qala I Zal 0799245039 Member
16 Nisar Ahmad Member Environment Protection Agency Takhar Observer
17 Haji Esmatullah Relations Officer Environment Protection Agency Badakhshan Observer
18 Alhaj Ramazani Extension Officer Agriculture Department Kunduz Member
19 Engineer Safiullah Noorzad
Team Leader 
Co-operator KRBP 0773136332 Member
Absent:
Eng. Mohd Tahir Ayoub Director Rural Development Takhar                        Co-chairman1. 
Mohd Eshaq Director Environment Protection Agency Kunduz            Co- chairman2. 
Mrs. Razmara Hawash Directress Women Affairs Takhar                            Member3. 
Taj Mohd Mirab Nahri Naqi Khanabad                                                        Member4. 
Mirab Nahri Zargar Takhar                          Member5. 
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Agenda:
Opening 1. 
Minutes of last meeting2. 
Planning of Water allocation for 1386 3. 
Discuses about chair for sub basin Council and River basin Agency 4. 
Any other business 5. 
Topic Detail Action
Top1. Opening Eng. M. Salim Akbar WM Director Takhar opened this meeting at 10:40am • 
and gave a short review of the last meeting.
Discussion opened about category of water users and selection of • 
representatives from them.
All members 
to attend 
the future 
meetings 
regularly.
Top2. Minutes of 
last meeting
• A short review of the minutes, both English and Dari versions were 
accepted.
• Discussion on water allocation planning was done in last meeting, but a 
review also made in this meeting.
• JBeekma TL KRBP said, in last meeting was decided about 12 categories 
in Taloqan sub basin and we shall discuss about water consumption by each of 
these categories.
• A detailed PPP on water inflow, outflow and estimates on water 
consumption was explained by JBeekma TL KRBP.
               PPP attached
JBeekma said we had hydro model and satellite images we know the snow and 
rainfall and tells us how much water we have in our sub basin and we should do 
our estimates based on them.
• JBeekma said we should start our planning for each year in month of 
March, because in that month we know how much water is available in our basin 
and from that; we can bring better water management in our basin.
GIS to help 
in better 
estimation 
of water 
as first 
estimates 
by the 
members in 
some parts 
needed 
to be 
corrected.
Top 4: Discuses about No. of seats 
for sub basin Council and River basin 
Agency. 
• JBeekma said that in next 
meeting we shall be ready to discuss 
about no of seat for sub basin council 
and river basin agency.
Members shall think about no of 
seats for sub basin council and river 
basin agency for discussion in next 
meeting
Top 5 : Any other business • Noting was Specific.
Closure: - Meeting was closed by Mr. Jelle Beekma TL of KRBP at 1:40 and next meeting will be on 23rd 
June 2007.
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Appendix 4. International Staff Interviewed
Hamish Nixon, governance researcher, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 26 September 2007 
Hans Husselman, team leader, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 10 September 2007
Jelle Beekma, team leader, Kunduz River Basin Program, 16 September 2007
Kris Prasada Rao, Natural Resource Management coordinator, Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, 
26 September 2007
Sayed Sharif Shobair, national project coordinator, Food and Agriculture Organization - Emergency Irrigation 
Rehabilitation Programme, 10 and 11 September 2007
Vincent Thomas, Participatory Management of Irrigation System project team, Taloqan, 18 September 
2007
Walter Osenberg, project manager, Welt Hunger Hilfe, 15 September 2007
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